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2I.
Introduction
Pursuing through newspapers in the last month, headlines about the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
proclaim “F.D.A. Approves Allergan Drug for Fighting Wrinkles,”1 “The Need to Test Drugs on Children,”2
and “F.D.A. Warns About Powdered Formula.”3 While the role of the FDA in approving new drugs is a
vital role for the protection of the health of Americans, it often overshadows another important aspect of
the FDA, that of ensuring the dissemination of accurate and truthful information to the public.
Recent headlines about the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) broadcast “F.T.C. Plans to Challenge Libbey
Purchase,”4 and “Sale of a Unit of Homestore is Approved,”5 focusing on the antitrust activities of the
agency, rarely mentioning the FTC as the guardian of advertising messages.
Food messages and claims barrage the average American consumer often and repeatedly. “One need not go
back to the apple in the Garden of Eden to ﬁnd false claims made for objects that, on the facts, do not
live up to their touted status.”6 Surveys show that consumers have conﬁdence generally in the FDA, 7 and
therefore consumers also have conﬁdence in the accuracy of advertising claims, for if these statements were
untrue, would not the FDA prevent these statements from being made?
Probably to many consumers’ surprise, the FDA does not have jurisdiction over food advertising claims.
There is a system of regulation; jurisdiction is just split between the FDA and the FTC.
1Reed Abelson, F.D.A. Approves Allergen Drug for Fighting Wrinkles, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 2002, at C4.
2The Need to Test Drugs on Children, N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 2002, § 4, at 14.
3National Brieﬁng Science and Health: F.D.A. Warns About Powdered Formula, N.Y. Times, Apr. 13, 2002, at A15.
4F.T.C. Plans to Challenge Libbey Purchase, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 2002, at C4.
5Sale of a Unit of Homestore Is Approved, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 2002, at C6.
6James T. O’Reilly, Food and Drug Administration §3.01 (2d ed. 1993).
7See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Protests on New Genes and Seeds Grow More Passionate In Europe, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 2000,
at A1 (favorably comparing American conﬁdence in the FDA with that of European regulators); Food Safety: Survey Results
for the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Remain Constant, Medical Letter on the CDC & FDA, Jan. 28, 2001, at 5 – 6
(“The results of the second government-wide customer satisfaction survey released December 22, 2000, showed that consumers
continue to be satisﬁed with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) performance in food labeling and consumer alerts
on food safety issues, and continue to have conﬁdence and trust in the FDA to ensure food safety for consumers.”).
3The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) generally prohibits misbranding, which is deﬁned as using a
false and misleading label or labeling, or having a label which does not contain the information speciﬁed in
the act, such as directions for use of the product and warnings about potential health dangers.8 This paper
will focus on the regulation of food misbranding generally, and not on the speciﬁc regulations concerning
font size, placement, format, and other such speciﬁcities of the labels themselves although violations of these
regulations will also result in a product being “misbranded.”9
The Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”)10 generally regulates advertising, as an “unfair trade
or practice” of section 5, or under section 12 which explicitly provides that it is unlawful for anyone to
disseminate any false advertising in connection with the purchase of foods or drugs.
This paper will proceed by ﬁrst analyzing the historical roots of the divided jurisdiction of the regulation of
food advertising and food labeling in Part II. Part III will then compare the misbranding standards by which
the FTC and the FDA act in their respective spear of regulation, in regards to food misbranding. Part IV
will discuss the regulation of health claims speciﬁcally. Health claims regulation is an interesting subset of
labeling and advertising regulation. The term “heath claims,” as used herein, refers to claims about diet
and health that links consumption of a food to the reduction of risk or delay in onset of a chronic disease.
Health claims are distinguished from nutritional claims, which merely state the vitamin or mineral content
of a particular food, without the next step – an invocation of why this content is important. Part V will
evaluate of this divided system.
8Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, c. 675, 52 Stat. 1040, (1938) (codiﬁed as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 – 392
(2000)).
9For a comprehensible guide to the current RDA regulations on size, placement, disclosure obligations, etc. of food labels,
see FDA, A Food Labeling Guide (Sept. 1994, last revised June 1999), available at www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼dms/ﬂg-toc.html.
The text of these regulations is available at 21 C.F.R. § 101.1 et. seq. (2002).
10Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), (codiﬁed as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 41 – 64).
4II.
History of Divided Jurisdiction
A.
The 1906 Act
In 1906, Congress enacted the Pure Food Law (“1906 Act”).11 This Act generally regulated labeling by pro-
hibiting false or misleading labels.12 The issue of regulating advertising was apparently never contemplated
during the Congressional discussions of this Act,13 nor was the FTC created yet. In implementing regula-
tions under the 1906 Act, the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce and Labor, deﬁned
the term “label” as used in section 8, as “any printed, pictorial or other matter upon or attached to any
package of a food or drug product, or any container thereof subject to the provisions of this act.”14 Courts
even further limited this deﬁnition, rather than broadly construing this Act to prevent abusive advertising
claims. In United States v. American Druggists’ Syndicate, the district court judge held that an advertising
circular, which was enclosed inside the carton with the product, was not within the intended scope of the
Act.15
In the sphere of health claims speciﬁcally, if a food product made a health claim on its label, the product
was regulated as both a food and a drug. Because of the Act’s inapplicability to advertising, health claims
that could not be made on the label “could be made with impunity in the collateral advertising.”16 This
lack of control over advertising “opened up methods for the perpetration of all kinds of fraud from petty
11Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768.
12For the text of § 8 of the 1906 Act, see infra note 100.
13For example, see H.R. Rep. No. 59-2118, (1st Sess. 1905), which never discussed the issue of advertising vs. labeling.
14Regulation 17 (originally enacted Oct. 17, 1906, as amended by F.I.D. 84, Jan. 31, 1908), available at U.S. Department
of Agriculture, Food and Drugs Act 22 (1914).
15United States v. American Druggists’ Syndicate, 186 F. 387, 391 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1911). See also United States v. 17
Bottles ...of an Article of Drugs Labelled in Part “B. & M.,” 55 F.2d 264, 268 (D. Md. 1932)
16Stephen Wilson, Food & Drug Regulation 83 (1942).
5deceptions to serious misrepresentations.”17 One example of such, in the area of drug products, was the
advertising of B. & M., a horse liniment.18 The government spent ten years and almost $75,000 to force the
removal of the claim that B. & M. cured tuberculosis oﬀ of the label. But the same claim could continue to
be made “over the radio – in newspapers or magazines – on billboards – in booklets, circulars, letters, and
all other advertising – the manufacturer may still make any claims that strike his fancy.”19
The potential for abuse was growing, as absolute advertising activity was dramatically increasing, as well as
the form of advertising changing. One proponents of extending FDA’s jurisdiction to covering advertising
focused on the changing technology. In 1936, Ruth deForest Lamb, an FDA Public Information oﬃcial,
wrote:
Thirty years ago, magazines and newspapers were published primarily for their ed-
itorial content, and radio—as we know it, anyway—was still undreamed of. To a great
extent, manufacturers depended upon their labels rather than collateral advertising to sell
goods. Requiring labels to tell the truth was thought to be ample protection against dishon-
est claims. It was, moreover, a decidedly radicals step for those days for the Government to
try to regulate labels, let alone other advertising. In consequence, the manufacturer of today
ﬁnds it possible to inﬂate the demand for his wares through wildly extravagant advertising
wholly at variance with the truthful claims on his label.20
Additionally, as evidence of the growing importance of advertising, between the years 1914 and 1929, general
advertising activity in the United States doubled.21 Radio also soon became a medium by which manufactures
17Id.
18Ruth deForest Lamb, American Chamber of Horrors 53 – 61 (1936). Other products and their claims made during
the reign of the 1906 Act include: Banbar and Healthagain as cures for diabetes, and Wilken’s Proprietary Medicine, Dr. Koch’s
Synthetic Anti-Toxin, and Mixer’s Cancer and Scrofula Syrup as cancer cures. Wilson, supra note 16, at 83.
19Id. at 58.
21Wilson, supra note 16, at 86.
6could advertise to a wide audience.22
B.
The FTC Act
The FTC Act was enacted in 1914, establishing the FTC as an independent administrative agency.23 De-
spite not having any express statutory authority to regulate food advertising, the FTC, from its inception,
considered false advertising and misleading labeling as within the practices that violate section 5, and court
decisions have supported the FTC’s asserting of authority.24 However, under the then-existing FTC Act,
the FTC was unable to eﬀectively regulate advertising in some circumstances, since section 5 only prohibited
“unfair methods of competition in commerce.” The Marmola case is illustrative of this weakness of the FTC
Act.25 Marmola was sold as an obesity cure, and this product in fact did lower weight, but with serious
health consequences, potentially even leading to death. The FDA did not have authority to regulate the
product,26 and the FTC tried but failed. The FTC ﬁled a complaint in 1928, ordering the company to
22It was around 1928 when radio became a signiﬁcant advertising medium. Wilson, supra note 16, at 86.
23Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codiﬁed as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 41 – 64).
24In regards to FTC authority over false advertising, see, e.g., Sears, Roebuck, & Co. v. F.T.C., 258 F. 307, 311 (7th Cir.
1919) (holding that the FTCA prohibition of unfair methods of competition included false advertising, for “[t]he commissioners,
representing the government as parens patriae, are to exercise their common sense, as informed by their knowledge of the
general idea of unfair trade at common law, and stop all those trade practices that have a capacity or a tendency to injure
competitors directly or through deception of purchasers, quite irrespective of whether the speciﬁc practices in question have yet
been denounced in common-law cases.”). In regards to FTC authority over misleading labeling, see, e.g., F.T.C. v. Good-Grape
Co., 45 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1930) (upholding injunction issued by the FTC to prevent Good-Grape from implying that its product
was natural grape juice on its labels); Royal Baking Powder Co. v. F.T.C., 281 F. 744 (2nd Cir. 1922) (aﬃrming the FTC
order, ﬁnding petitioner engaged in an unfair method of competition by intentionally using labels for its new baking powder
similar to the old baking powder, in an eﬀort to mislead purchasers as to the contents of the new baking powder.).
25Lamb, supra note 18, at 7 – 9.
26The FDA could not prevent the sale of Marmola because it was not a “drug” within the deﬁnition of the 1906 Act, for
the condition is was “intended to cure, mitigate or prevent,” – that of obesity – was not a condition generally recognized as a
disease. Lamb, supra note 18, at 9. During the years 1906 – 1938, the Post Oﬃce was the other government agency that had
any success, albeit limited, in regulating advertising. This department can take action if the mails are used to defraud, but of
course has no control over other forms of advertising. A Post Oﬃce prosecution against Marmola resulted in a $5000 ﬁne in
1914, but the company changed its name and location at least twice and just simply continued as before. See Wilson, supra
note 16, at 84; Lamb, supra note 18, at 6 – 8.
7stop advertising Marmola as safe and eﬀective. The Sixth Circuit,27 and later the Supreme Court,28 deter-
mined that the FTC did not have the authority to act in that the FTC’s powers were limited to protecting
competition and not consumers, and the FTC failed to show that any competition existed. In so holding,
the Supreme Court looked to the purpose of the act to protect competition.29 Thus, FTC authority was
limited to circumstances where there was at least one competitor who might be harmed by the oﬀending
advertisement. This decision was signiﬁcant not only for preventing FTC action in certain circumstances,
but also because it required the FTC to expend time and monetary resources in all cases to prove that there
was injury to competition.
But despite this holding, the chairman of the Commission, Ewin Davis, defended the current Act as eﬀective,
arguing that the FTC was able in virtually all other cases to assert jurisdiction. He noted, “[I]t is the rarest
case in the world, if it ever exists, where the consuming public is adversely aﬀected by false or misleading
advertisements that a competitor is not also aﬀected, and consequently we would have the requisite showing
of competition.”30
27Raladam Co. v. F.T.C., 42 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1930).
28F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931). For a criticism of this decision, see Note, Scope of the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission Over False and Misleading Advertising, 40 Yale L.J. 617, 629 (“Moreover a logical application of
the court’s hypothesis would lead to anomalous results. It imports, for example, that although by the statute proceedings are
to be instituted in the public interest, yet where the public alone is injured by a fraudulent practice, the Commission is not
authorized to intervene. Again, if the deception is prevalent throughout an entire trade, it becomes impregnable; but when one
honest competitor enters the ﬁeld, the Commission’s jurisdiction is established. Finally, compliance with the court’s rule would
compel the Commission in every case to try the legitimacy of the activities of competitors. It cannot be supposed that such
incongruities were intended. Rather would it seem that the ‘unfair methods’ referred to in the Trade Commission Act include
any policy of sales promotion which tends to deceive the public.”). See also Milton Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission Over False Advertising, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 549 – 51 (1931).
29F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. at 647 – 48 (“The paramount aim of the act is the protection of the public from the evils
likely to result from the destruction of competition or the restriction of it in a substantial degree, and this presupposes the
existence of some substantial competition to be aﬀected, since the public is not concerned in the maintenance of competition
which itself is without real substance.”).
30Note, The FTC’s Injunctive Authority Against False Advertising of Food and Drugs, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 745, 758 n.79
(1977).
8C.
The Debate
Between the ﬁrst eﬀorts for revision and the 1938 enactments, consensus grew that more explicit controls
over advertising were necessary. Once it was accepted that something needed to be done,31 the debate
centered on what was to be the form of this regulation, and more speciﬁcally, what agency, as between the
FTC and the FDA, was to have authority over this regulation.32
Those supporting the FDA as having jurisdiction included President Roosevelt. In 1935, in a special message
to Congress urging the adoption of a new Food and Drug Act, President Roosevelt emphasized the need for
practical improvements, especially by extending the controls of the FDA that were formerly applicable only
to labels to advertising also.33
Those supporting extending the FDA’s jurisdiction over advertising argued that the FTC was concerned
primarily with economic issues, such as trade and competition, and not the protection of consumer health,34
and that advertising regulation is a necessary corollary to labeling regulation.35 Also argued was that the
31One of the ﬁrst proposals for change dated to 1912, the Richardson Bill. If it had been enacted, it would have given
explicit control over advertising to the predecessor of the FDA. Wilson, supra note 16, at 86. Consensus continued to grow; for
example, in 1917, the United States Department of Agriculture Annual Report, identiﬁed a “serious limitation” in the eﬀective
control over the food supply was the lack of jurisdiction by the Bureau of Chemistry (which later became the FDA) over false
or misleading claims not made on food labels. Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of Government Regulation
of Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 39 Food Drug Cosmetic L.J. 2 (1984).
32For a detailed analysis of progress of the speciﬁc proposed bills and their amendments, David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 Law & Contemp. Prob. 2 (1939). What
follows in this paper is a general analysis of the policy concerns discussed at this time, to enlighten the later discussion of the
proper division of power between the FDA and the FTC now.
33President Roosevelt Special Message to Congress, March 22, 1935, available at Lamb, supra note 18, at 332 – 34.
34See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 16, at 111.
35See, e.g., 83 Cong. REc. 566 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Mapes) (“If administration of half of the law goes to the
Federal Trade Commission and the other half remains with the Pure Food and Drug Administration, it will simply cripple the
enforcement of the law. It is not necessary to cast aspersions upon either the members of the Federal Trade Commission or
the people responsible for the administration of the pure food and drug law to reach that conclusion. Plain common sense will
cause anyone who considers the matter to reach that conclusion.”).
9FTC’s enforcement powers and procedures would not eﬀectively protect consumer interests,36 especially
since there were no direct penalties for violations of the FTC Act. The FTC only had the power to order
cease and desist orders, which could only be enforced by court action, which necessarily involved delays,37
thus allowing a deceptive advertiser the opportunity to beneﬁt from his deception, and move onto a new
form of deception before the Commission could restrain him.38
Conversely, some Congressmen favored the FTC’s remedial, as opposed to preventative, procedure as more
appropriate to deﬁne the line between deception and puﬀery; that remedial action was more consistent
with notions of fairness.39 The FDA was also criticized for not having a formal adversary procedure by
which to govern the agency’s actions.40 Representative Lea argued that the FDA is a “typical bureaucratic
organization,” and to eﬀectively control advertising, a quasi-judicial body, like the FTC, was necessary.41
Many Congressmen were concerned that the FDA would harass honest businessmen, who would work in
fear of action against an inadvertent statement.42 The FDA, at this time, had a reputation among some
Congressmen as being arbitrary in its treatment of commercial interests.43 Senator Howard W. Ambruster
went further in his criticism of the FDA, asserting that the FDA selectively enforced the 1906 Act, for the
FDA was afraid to attack large industry players.44 He stated that extending FDA jurisdiction to include
36See, e.g., 83 Cong. Rec. 394 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Mapes).
37See The FTC’s Injunctive Authority Against False Advertising of Food and Drugs, supra note 30, at 757 – 763. Prior to
1938, the FTC had been required to petition the courts for enforcement of an order, which could only be done upon evidence
that the order was being violated. Because of this system, an advertiser might actually have to repeat an oﬀense three times
before eﬀective punishment: once by which to issue a cease and desist order, again to support a petition for enforcement, and
a third time to justify imposition of court contempt sanctions. Id. at 758, n. 80.
38See, e.g., 83 Cong. Rec. 394 (remarks of Rep. Kenney); id. at 3287 (remarks of Sen. Copeland); Foods, Drugs, and
Cosmetics: Hearings on S.5 Before the Senate Comm. On Commerce, 74th Cong. 360 (1935) (statement of W.G. Campbell,
then Chief of FDA). Congress did respond to these alleged deﬁciencies in the Wheeler-Lea Act in 1938, by establishing civil
penalties for violations of Commission case and desist orders. For a discussion of the early debate concerning these provisions,
see Mitchell Salem Fisher, The Proposed Food and Drugs Act: A Legal Critique, 1 Law & Contemp. Prob. 74 (1933).
39See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 75-1613, at 4 – 6 (1st Sess. 1937).
40See, e.g., 83 Cong. Rec. 410 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Lea); id. at 411(remarks of Rep. O’Malley).
41Id. at 566 (remarks of Rep. Lea).
42See, e.g., 83 Cong. Rec. 401 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Halleck).
43See 80 Cong. Rec. 401 (1938) (remarks of Rep. McCormick).
44Howard Watson Ambruster, Why Not Enforce the Laws We Already Have? How and Why Industries’ Outlaws
are Crucifying Harvey Wiley’s Pure Food and Drug Law, 49 – 53 (1935). In support of this assertion, Senator Ambruster
compared the actions of the FTC and the FDA in controlling aspirin manufacturer’s fraudulent claims that aspirin “does not
depress the heart.” The FTC has successfully forced Bayer Aspirin from using this claim in its advertisements, while the FDA
10advertising “can only result in the immunity of jurisdictional conﬂict for all violators having funds to pay
attorneys.”45
Many Congressmen did not like the New Deal activists of the current Department of Agriculture, nor the
Department’s current head, Rexford G. Tugwell, and were highly suspicious of the Roosevelt Administrations’
aggressive consumer protectionism.46
Overall, the food and drug industry favored FTC jurisdiction.47 Not surprisingly, the FTC favored retention
of control.48 On behalf of the FTC, Commissioner Ewin L. Davis advocated that the Commission retain
authority, presenting the accomplishments of the Commission in suppressing fraudulent advertising thus
far.49 He also argued that the FTC adjudicatory process was the better process by which to regulate
advertising, also noting that the FTC and the FDA have worked well together in the past.50
In the course of the Congressional debates, one proposed compromise was nearly successful in resolving the
issue. In 1936, both the House and the Senate had passed almost identical versions of a new food and drug
bill, agreeing on all issues except for which agency was to have jurisdiction over food advertising.51 The
Conference committee proposed a compromise that would have given the FDA jurisdiction only over food
and drug advertising that aﬀected health, leaving responsibility for all other violations with the FTC.52 This
had ignored this claim on the labels of the two largest violators, but attacked smaller manufacturers. Id. at 51 – 53.
45Id. at 53.
46Charles W. Dunn, Federal Food Drug & Cosmetic Act: A Statement of its Legislative Record 26 (1938).
47Wilson, supra note 16, at 111.
48See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 16, at 113; Ambruster, supra note 44, at 50.
49See Ambruster, supra note 44, at 50 (quoting Commissioner Davis) (“Of course, ...it is a matter for Congress to determine
as to where it wants to place this jurisdiction, but I am simply reminding you that this Commission has had and has exercised
this jurisdiction for 19 years, and there has grown up a long line of decisions. We have a trained personnel. We have ﬁeld
oﬃcers and investigators, and are prepared to conduct the ﬁeld investigations. ...[I]n the case of food and drugs, or cosmetics,
or whether they cure or not, we have been calling upon the Department of Agriculture for their analysis and opinion ...[T]he
analysis of the technical experts of the Department of Agriculture are received before the Federal Trade Commission just like
any other evidence.”).
50Ambruster, supra note 44, at 50 (quoting Commissioner Davis) (“The Commission sits there in a judicial capacity and
undertakes to decide the case in accordance with the law and the facts; and in that connection, under The Federal Trade
commission, has grown up a long line of precedents, not only in the Commission, but in the Court decisions.... The Pure Food
and Drug division of the Department of Agriculture ...have heretofore repeatedly referred to the commission false advertising
upon which the Commission has proceeded to act.”)
51See 79 Cong. Rec. 8356 (1935); 80 Cong. Rec. 8356 (1936).
5280 Cong. Rec. 10514 – 10520 (1936).
11compromise ultimately failed, due to the House’s unwillingness to expand the FDA’s jurisdiction to food
advertising.53
Ultimately, the FTC of the 1930s was more politically compatible with the House of Representatives than
the New Deal leader of the Department of Agriculture, 54 and the House did not want to give too much
discretionary power to an administrative agency. The FTC was considered procedurally fairer because
of its adversarial administrative hearings and the enforcement of its orders was postponed until judicial
review was completed.55 At the end of the debate, in 1938, Congress declined to give FDA jurisdiction
over advertising56 and instead conﬁrmed FTC authority over false and misleading advertising by passing
the Wheeler-Lea Amendments,57 which amended Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.58 The
ﬁnal version of the new food law59 made no reference at all to advertising, thus implicitly announcing that
advertising jurisdiction would remain with the FTC.
5380 Cong. Rec. 10674 – 10680 (1936).
54See O’Reilly, supra note 6, §24.02.
55See The FTC’s Injunctive Authority Against False Advertising of Food and Drugs, supra note 30, at 766.
56Congress has granted speciﬁc authority to regulate advertising to the FDA in a few circumstances: for prescription drugs
under § 502(n) of the Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780, and for vitamins and minerals under §§
403(a)(2) and 707 of the Vitamin-Mineral Amendments of 1976, Pub. L No. 94-278, 90 Stat. 410 (1976) (codiﬁed as amended
at 21 U.S.C. §350). FTC does retain authority over regulating non-prescription drugs.
57Wheeler-Lea Amendments, ch. 49, § 4, 52 Stat. 111, 114 (1938) (amending § 12 of the FTC Act) (codiﬁed at 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(1)).
58Section 5(a)(1), now provides that “[u]nfair methods of competition in or aﬀecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or aﬀecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.” 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000).
59Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codiﬁed as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 – 392
(2000)).
12D.
Current Division
Generally, the FDA has jurisdiction over labels and labeling. Under the FDCA, a label is on the package,
and labeling is that which accompanies the package, including the label. Speciﬁcally, the term label is
deﬁned as “a display of written, printed, or graphic matter upon the immediate container of any article,”60
and labeling is deﬁned as “all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article or
any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.”61 The FDA and courts have given an
expansive deﬁnition to “accompanying,” thereby maximizing FDA authority.62 Advertising is everything
else, anything that lacks “immediate connection with sale of the product.”63
The FTC has the authority to regulate advertising generally. While Section 15 deﬁnes “false advertisement”
as excluding labeling, the FTC is still able to assert authority under Section 5’s general prohibition against
unfair competition. The Second Circuit has speciﬁcally rejected the argument that a claim made only on a
label was not within the FTC’s authority, and only within the authority of the FDA.64 Thus the jurisdictions
6021 U.S.C. § 321(k) (2000). The sections continues, providing that “a requirement made by or under authority of this Act
that any word, statement, or other information appear on the label shall not be considered to be complied with unless such
word, statement, or other information also appears on the outside container or wrapper, if any there be, of the retail package
of such article, or is easily legible through the outside container or wrapper.” Id.
6121 U.S.C. § 321(m) (2000)
62See Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 350, reh’g denied, 335 U.S. 900 (1948), reh’g denied, 336 U.S. 911 (holding that
even though the product and the circular were shipped in separate parcels, they nevertheless accompany each other within the
meaning of the FTCA) (“One article or thing is accompanied by another when it supplements or explains it, in the manner
that a committee report of the Congress accompanies a bill. No physical attachment one to the other is necessary. It is the
textual relationship that is signiﬁcant.”); United States v. Urbuteit, 335 U.S. 355, 356 – 57 (1948) (holding that where product
and leaﬂets explaining use were mailed separately, leaﬂet was part of the label); V. E. Irons, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.2d
34, 39 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957) (“It is clear that the term ’labeling’ must be given a broad meaning to
include all literature used in the sale of food and drugs, whether or not it is shipped into interstate commerce along with the
article. There is no doubt that the printed circulars, pamphlets, brochures and newsletters distributed by appellants in the
present case constituted ’labeling’ within the statutory deﬁnition, and thus may properly be received in evidence as proof of
false or misleading statements.”); United States v. Guardian Chem. Corp., 410 F.2d 157, 160 – 61 (2nd Cir. 1969) (“In order
to ‘accompany’ an article and thus constitute ‘labeling’ for it, printed pamphlets or brochures need not be shipped along with
the article. They may be sent out either before or after the article and still ‘accompany’ it, as long as the distribution of the
drug and the brochures are parts of an ‘integrated distribution program.”’).
63United States v. 24 Bottles “Sterling Vinegar ...,” 338 F.2d 157, 160 (2nd Cir. 1964).
64Fresh Grown Preserve Corp v. F.T.C., 125 F.2d 917 (2nd Cir. 1942) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that a claim made
only on a label was not within the FTC’s authority and could only be challenged by the FDA, for the deﬁnition of “false
13of the FDA and of the FTC do overlap, for labeling is within the scope of advertising.65
Because of this overlap the two agencies in 1954 agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding, under which
the FTC has assumed primary responsibility for regulating food advertising, other than labeling, while the
FDA has taken primary responsibility for regulating food labeling.66 The purpose of this Memorandum is
to reduce the duplication of regulation and conserve agency resources by eliminating confusion as to what
agency regulated what.67 Despite this Memorandum, it is possible that both agencies may proceed against
the same defendant,68 and this Memorandum is only an informal allocation of enforcement responsibility
advertisement” within Section 15 is limited to cases arising under Sections 12, 13, and 14, and not Section 5) (“Like false
labeling, it may have been deceptive and have amounted to unfair competition under Sec. 5 and we need now be concerned
with nothing more.”).
65See also Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 351 (1948) (“We have searched the legislative history in vain, however, to
ﬁnd any indication that Congress had the purpose to eliminate from the Act advertising which performs the function of labeling.
Every labeling is in a sense an advertisement. The advertising which we have here performs the same function as it would if it
were on the article or on the containers or wrappers.”); United States v. Research Laboratories, Inc., 126 F.2d 42, 45 (9th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 656 (1942) (“Most, if not all labeling is advertising. The term labeling is deﬁned in the Act as
including all printed matter accompanying any article. Congress did not, and we cannot, exclude from the deﬁnition printed
matter which constitutes advertising. ...It is immaterial, if true, that the makers and advertisers of Nue-Ovo could have been
proceeded against by the Federal Trade Commission under the Federal Trade Commission Act and could have been ordered to
cease and desist from publishing and distributing the circular entitled What is Arthritis. The power of the District Court [to]
condemn misbranded articles is not impaired, diminished, or in any wise aﬀected by the possibility that such misbranding may
also be the subject of a cease and desist order or even by the fact, if it be a fact, that such an order has actually issued.”);
United States v. 250 Jars of U.S. Fancy Pure Honey, 218 F. Supp. 208 (D.C. Mich. 1963), aﬀ’d, 344 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Paddock, 67 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Mo. 1946) (“Advertising and labeling circulars may be the same and yet
perform the two oﬃces of advertising, and labeling.”)
66Working Agreement Between Federal Trade Commission and Food and Drug Administration, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 9850.01 (June 9, 1954) (as originally enacted); Updated FTC-FDA Liaison Agreement – Advertising of Over-the-Counter
Drugs, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,539, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 9851 (Sept. 16, 1971). The 1971 Memorandum stated the division
as follows:
In order to facilitate the purposes of this agreement, it is speciﬁcally agreed that:
a. With the exception of prescription drugs, the Federal Trade Commission has primary responsibility with respect to the
regulation of the truth or falsity of all advertising (other than labeling) of foods, drugs, devices, and cosmetics. In the absence of
express agreement between the two agencies to the contrary, the Commission will exercise primary jurisdiction over all matters
regulating the truth or falsity of advertising of foods, drugs, ...devices, and cosmetics;
b. The Food and Drug Administration has primary responsibility for preventing misbranding of foods, drugs, devices, and
cosmetics shipped in interstate commerce. ...In the absence of express agreement between the two agencies to the contrary,
the Food and Drug Administration will exercise primary jurisdiction over all matters regulating the labeling of foods, drugs,
devices, and cosmetics.
67Id. The stated purpose of the 1971 agreement is as follows:
It is agreed that the common objective of preventing injury and deception of the consumer requires that the statutory
authorities and procedures, and the manpower and other resources available to each agency are so employed as to aﬀord
maximum protection to the consumer. This means joint planning of coordinated programs, exchange of information and
evidence to the extent permitted by law, by the staﬀs of both agencies in appropriate undertakings and the careful selection of
the procedure of either agency (or simultaneously by both) promising greatest beneﬁt to the public.
Despite this agreement, the FTC found it necessary to issue a policy statement in 1994 concerning food advertising and
health claims clarifying the use of health claims. See infra Part IV.C.
68The Memorandum does contempt both agencies proceeding against the same defendant, but states that it “shall be restricted
to those highly unusual situations where it is clear that the public interest requires two separate proceedings.” It deﬁnes a liaison
14and therefore not a defense to an FTC action concerning food labeling.69
In 1976, Congress added section 707 of the FDCA, which addresses the aforementioned overlap in jurisdiction,
speciﬁcally when a claim made in a medium typically regarded as advertisement, falls within the deﬁnition
of labeling.70 Section 707(a) requires that the FDA notify the FTC before taking action itself if it suspects
the advertising as causing the misbranding a food, with the notice outlining the reasons misbranding is
suspected and accompanied by the evidence of such. If the FTC does not act or provide notice of its intent
to act, within 30 days of the FDA’s notice, the FDA may initiate action; if the FTC initially decides to
pursue action, but fails to follow through within 60 days, then the FDA may pursue action.71 This notice
requirement and 30 to 90 day holding period before FDA action represents the Congressional decision that in
these scenarios where the authority is unclear, it would prefer the FTC to pursue enforcement proceedings.72
Not only do the deﬁnitions of labeling versus advertising control agency authority, but also does the deﬁnitions
of food, versus drug, versus medical device. While this paper will focus only on the regulation of food, it is
important to note that the FDA has jurisdiction over both the advertising and labeling of prescription drugs
and restricted medical devices, per statute, thereby eliminating FTC from this arena.73 The distinction
relationship is order to prevent dueling actions from occurring. Id. For examples of coordinated action, see Warner-Lambert
Co. v. F.T.C., 361 F. Supp. 948, 952 (D.D.C. 1973); Warner-Lambert Co. v. F.T.C., 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Dir. 1977); United
States v. 1 Dozen Bottles ...Boncquet Tablets, 146 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1944); United states v. Research Laboratories, Inc,
126 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1942); United States v. Various Quantities ...“Instant Alberty Food,” 83 F. Supp. 882 (D.D.C. 1949);
United States v. Paddock, 67 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Mo. 1946). While not a FDA-FTC conﬂict, the court in Sunkist Growers
held that the Secretary of Agriculture did not have exclusive jurisdiction. Sunkist Growers, Inc v. F.T.C., 464 F. Supp. 302
(C.D. Cal. 1979). See also Friedlander v. United States Postal Service, 658 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that the
existence of FDA or FTC jurisdiction over fraudulent mailings does not prevent the Postal Service from proceeding).
69Julian O. von Kalinowksi, et al., Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 5-14.1 (2nd ed. 2002).
70Proxmire Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-278, § 501(b), 90 Stat. 401, 412 (1976) (adding § 707 of the FDCA, codiﬁed at 21
U.S.C. § 378).
7121 U.S.C. § 378(b) (2000).
72H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1005, at 31 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 742, 755. This Report does not explicitly
express any dissatisfaction with the current division of authority; in fact it speciﬁcally recognizes the 1954 Memorandum of
Understanding, and encourages the FTC and FDA “to continue to coordinate their regulatory actions in a manner to avoid
unnecessary duplication and waste.” Id. The memorandum did not explicitly delineate jurisdiction between the two agencies
when some method of promotion could be both advertising and labeling. The agreement did provided for the coordination
and use of liaisons when the same or similar claims are found in both labeling and advertising, thus indicating when there
was overlap, they would coordinate and decide on a case-by-case method. See Working Agreement Between Federal Trade
Commission and Food and Drug Administration, supra note 66.
73In the Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §11, 76 Stat. 780 (codiﬁed in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.)
Congress enunciated that with regards to prescription drugs, advertisement of such are not subject to the FTC Act relating
to false and misleading advertising of drugs, thus eliminating any overlap of jurisdiction whether the two agencies, as was
15between a food and a drug is signiﬁcant in the sphere of FDA/FTC jurisdiction because the FDA considers
the use of any unapproved health claims on a food to cause that product to be deemed a drug, thereby
under the enforcement authority of the FDA.74 In the medial device arena, the FDA recently attempted,
but failed,75 to assert regulatory authority over tobacco products as restricted medical devices, so that the
agency could exert control not only over their distribution and use, but over their advertising as well, thus
attempting to usurp the authority of the FTC.76
Thus, in regards to food, in practice the FDA monitors labeling, while the FTC monitors advertising. But
this summary may have made the distinction between advertising and labeling seem more absolute than it
really is. While these jurisdictional lines have been drawn, the Memorandum of Understanding is revocable
by either agency with 30 days notice, thus the FTC could soon assert authority over labeling.77 But these
lines are interwoven even more, in that advertising and labeling do not act independently of each other; what
advertising contains is relevant to what is said in labeling, for “advertising is the dictionary of the labeler.”78
previously the case.
74See infra Part IV.
75FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (holding that Congress had not granted the FDA
jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products, looking to the FDCA as a whole, it was clear that Congress intended to excluded
tobacco products from the FDA’s jurisdiction, for if so, the FDCA their removal from the market entirely; such a ban would
contradict Congress’ clear intent as expressed in recent tobacco-speciﬁc legislation).
76See Lars Noah, Statutory “Smoke” and Mirrors,” 51 Food Drug L.J. 481, 483.
77See Working Agreement Between Federal Trade Commission and Food and Drug Administration, supra note 66.
78Peter B. Hutt, Questions and Answers, 28 Food Drug Cosmetic L.J. 138, 144 (1973) (noting that the FDA has taken
this position in numerous lawsuits since 1938).
16III.
Misbranding Standards
A.
Misbranding Under the 1906 Act
Congress enacted the United State’s ﬁrst comprehensive, national regulation of foods and drugs79 with the
1906 Act.80 Prior to the 1906 Act, Congress had enacted various statutes to control the adulteration of
speciﬁc food products,81 of food sold in the District of Columbia,82 of exported and imported meat and
cattle,83 of drug products,84 and later of imported products generally.85 It was not until 1902 that Congress
begun to address the issues of misbranding and mislabeling speciﬁcally, by prohibiting the sale of “any diary
or food product which shall be falsely labeled or branded as to the State or Territory in which they are
made, produced, or grown.”86
There were many attempts by the states prior to 1906, even in colonial times, to regulate adulteration.87 The
ﬁrst state general food law was passed in Illinois in 1874. A model law was drafted and enacted in New York
79For a history of governmental regulation of the integrity of the food supply from ancient times to 1985, see Hutt & Hutt,
supra note 31.
80Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768.
81See Act of Mar. 2, 1883, ch. 64, 22 Stat. 451, amended by Act of Mar. 2, 1897, ch. 358, 29 Stat. 604 (banning importation
of adulterated tea); Act of Aug. 2, 1886, ch. 840, 24 Stat. 209 (regulating oleomargarine and authorizing monitoring for
ingredients used that were “deleterious to the public health”); Act of June 6, 1896, ch. 337, 29 Stat. 253 (regulating ﬁlled
cheese under oleomargarine scheme). The Board of Tea, and the Tea Importation Act of 1897 was repealed recently, see Federal
Tea Tasters Repeal Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-128, 110 Stat. 1198.
82Act of Oct. 12, 1888, ch. 1090, 25 Stat. 549; Act of May 5, 1898, ch. 241, 30 Stat. 398 (prohibiting candy adulteration in
the District of Columbia).
83Act of Aug. 30, 1890, ch. 839, 26 Stat. 414; Act of Mar.3, 1891, ch. 555, 26 Stat. 1089; Act of July 24, 1897, ch. 11, §25,
30 Stat. 151, 210.
84See The Vaccine Act of 1813, ch. 37, 2 Stat. 806; Import Drugs Act of 1848, ch. 70, 9 Stat. 237.
85Act of Mar. 1, 1899, ch. 325, 30 Stat. 947. See also Wilson, supra note 16, at 16. The eﬃcacy of this act can be
questioned in that in 1905, it was observed that ten times as much Vermont maple syrup was sold every year as that state could
produce. Id. at 25.
86Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1357, 32 Stat. 632. For the report accompanying this enactment, see H.R. Rep. No. 56-872 (1st
Sess. 1900).
87Hutt & Hutt, supra note 31, at 35 – 44.
17in 1881, and most states followed within the next 25 years.88 But state legislation was inadequate because,
by in acting independently, the states could not regulate interstate commerce. Additionally, standards across
the states varied, making it impossible for a manufacturer to satisfy all the requirements.89
Between 1879 and 1906, more than 100 Congressional bills had been introduced that attempted general
legislation, yet none were enacted.90 Of these proposals, the ﬁrst bill aimed at protecting public health,
rather than protecting American farmers, was introduced in 1891.91 But two developments were necessary
in order to enable the passage of a truly successful, general, national legislation: ﬁrst, the creation of large
urban centers which led to the development of national commerce, which needed national regulation; and
second, the acceptance of Congressional jurisdiction to regulate, rather than state or local governments.92
Opposition to these bills was primarily from food and drug industries, as well as from newspapers and
magazines.93 The newspapers opposed the proposals because the bill would aﬀect their largest advertisers,
and advertising for most newspapers consisted of the majority of its revenue.94 Leading up to 1906, public
demand for federal protection increased, and industry opposition lessened when the reputable manufacturers
realized that a national law was in their interests.95 In 1905, President Roosevelt entered the debate in his
annual message to Congress, calling for the enactment of a law regulating the adulteration and misbranding
88Wilson, supra note 16, at 11.
89Wilson, supra note 16, at 18 – 19.
90Vetter, Food Laws and Regulations 7 (1996). General and speciﬁc combined, between Jan. 20, 1879 – the ﬁrst such
bill – and June 30, 1906, exactly 190 measures were introduced in the House of Representatives that somehow protected food
and drug consumers. 4 American Landmark Legislation 1 (Irving J. Sloan, ed., 1976). Of these, eight became law, six
passed the House, 23 were reported on favorably by the relevant House committee, nine reported adversely, and 141 were never
heard from again. Id.
91See Wilson, supra note 16, at 15. This bill, sponsored by Senator Paddock of Nebraska, was proposed in response
to approximately 200 petitions from the public praying for the prevention of food adulteration. See Landmark American
Legislation, supra note 90, at 3.
92Hutt & Hutt, supra note 31, at 47 – 53.
93Objections within congress were ostensibly argued upon the measures too broadly construing the commerce clause of the
constitution, or too much delegation of power to the Secretary of Agriculture. See Landmark American Legislation, supra
note 90, at 3 – 4. But often opponents never openly voiced their true objections, and delays were achieved on the arguments of
“the need for discussing more pressing legislation, agreement with the principle but opposition to the construction of the bill,
the desirability of permitting the states to handle their own problems, or the necessity of preventing hasty and ill-considered
legislation.” Id. at 5.
94Wilson, supra note 16, at 22 – 24.
95See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 16, at 18 – 19; Landmark American Legislation, supra note 90, at 7 – 9.
18of food and drugs.96
In 1906, an act was ﬁnally passed.97 The stated purpose of this act was “for preventing the manufacture,
sale, or transportation of adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or deleterious foods, drugs, medicines,
and liquors, and for regulating traﬃc therin.”98 The Act declared it unlawful to manufacture and transport
any food or drug that is adulterated or misbranded.99 Section 8 deﬁned misbranding generally as false or
misleading labeling or branding.100 The 1906 Act’s labeling provisions operated on the basic premise that
if people are given accurate information about what they are consuming, they will be able to make safer
choices. Prior to 1913, the 1906 Act did not contain any aﬃrmative disclosure obligations, but the third
provision under “in case of food” of section 8 was then amended to deﬁne any package that “the quantity
96See Landmark American Legislation, supra note 90, at 7.
97Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768.
98Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, preamble, 34 Stat. 768, 768. The purpose, according to the Supreme Court, of the
misbranding prohibition is “to make it possible that the consumer should know that an article purchased was what it purported
to be; that it might be bought for what it really was, and not upon misrepresentations as to character and quality.” United
States v. Lexington Mill & Elevator Co., 232 U.s. 399, 409 (1914).
99Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, §§ 1 & 2, 34 Stat. 768. Section 2 does exempt from misbranded or adulteration
classiﬁcation any article that is intended for export, is indeed exported, and the preparation or packing does not conﬂict with
the laws of the foreign country.
100Section 8, as originally enacted, reads:
That the term “misbranded,” as used herein, shall apply to all drugs, or articles of food, or articles which enter into the
composition of food, the package or label of which shall bear any statement, design, or device regarding such article, or the
ingredients or substances contained therein which shall be false or misleading in any particular, and to any food or drug product
which is falsely branded as to the State, Territory, or country in which it is manufactured or produced.
That for the purposes of this Act an article shall also be deemed to be misbranded:
In the case of drugs: [omitted]
In the case of food:
First. If it be an imitation of or oﬀered for sale under the distinctive name of another article.
Second. If it be labeled or branded so as to deceive or mislead the purchaser, or purport to be a foreign product when not
so, or if the contents of the package as originally put up shall have been removed in whole or in part and other contents shall
have been placed in such package, or if it fails to bear a statement on the label of the quantity or proportion of any morphine,
opium....
Third. If in package form, and the contents are state in terms of weight or measure, they are not plainly and correctly stated
on the outside of the package.
Fourth. If the package containing it or its label shall bear any statement, design, or device regarding the ingredients or the
substances contained therein, which statement, design, or device shall be false or misleading in any particular: Provided, That
an article of food which does not contain any added poisonous or deleterious ingredients shall not be deemed to be adulterated
or misbranded in the following cases:
First. [If a mixture or compound is or becomes to be known by a distinctive name, that name can be used if accompanied
on label with where the product was manufactured or produced.]
Second. In the case of articles labeled, branded, or tagged so as to plainly indicate that they are compounds, imitations, or
blends, and the word “compound,” “imitation,” or “blend,” as the case may be, is plainly stated on the package in which it is
oﬀered for sale....
Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, §8, 34 Stat. 768.
19of the contents be not plainly and conspicuously marked on the outside of the package in terms of weight,
measure, or numerical count” as misbranded.101
While the 1906 Act deﬁned misbranding, the courts were ultimately responsible for the interpretation and
application of the Act. The courts imprecisely deﬁned the terms false and misleading. One court deﬁned
these terms as: “False means, of course, untrue. Misleading means calculated to deceive, actually tending
to deceive.”102 The same judge in another case seemingly eliminated an inaccurate, but non-misleading
statement as violating the statute, by stating that as regarding the word “false” and the word “misleading”
as used in section 8,
[T]he two words are of the same import and one or the other or both may be indiﬀerently
used. The appropriate meaning of the word ‘false’ as extracted from the dictionary is
‘adapted or intended to mislead,’ and the word ‘misleading’ means ‘tending to lead astray,
deceptive.’ I perceive no diﬀerence in these signiﬁcations for the purpose of the statue in
question.103
Comparatively, while an inaccurate, but non-misleading statement may not violate the 1906 Act, early cases
established that a literally true statement may also violate the Act. For example, the Supreme Court ruled
that the statement “Made from selected apples” was deceptive when the vinegar was in fact made from
chopped dried apples.104 The court, in so holding, emphasized the conjunctive “or,” stating:
101Gould Amendment, Act of Mar. 3, 1913, 37 Stat. 732.
102United States v. Von Bremen, Notice of Judgment No. 1949 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), in U.S. Department of Agriculture,
supra note 14, 347, at 347.
104United States v. Ninety-Five Barrels, More or Less, Alleged Apple Cider Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438 (1924)
20The statute is plain and direct. Its comprehensive terms condemn every statement, design,
and device which may mislead or deceive. Deception may result from the use of statements
not technically false or which may be literally true. The aim of the statute is to prevent
that resulting from indirection and ambiguity, as well as from statements which are false.
It is not diﬃcult to choose statements, designs, and devices which will not deceive. Those
which are ambiguous and liable to mislead should be read favorably to the accomplishment
of the purpose of the act.105
To ﬁnd a violation of the 1906 Act, there must be intent to deceive, further limiting the potential scope of
the Act. In requiring evidence of intent, the Eighth Circuit relied on the purpose of the act, that of “to
prevent the injurious deceit of purchasers.”106
In deﬁning misleading, “[t]he question is whether this label is calculated by its wording or nature to deceive
the public,” the public being “reasonable members of the body of citizens who are entitled to know so far as
labels can tell you what it is you are eating.”107 In United States v. Ten Barrels of Vinegar, a district court
held that in evaluating whether a label is misleading, and therefore misbranded, should be judged as that of
a consumer’s ﬁrst impression, even if “a deliberate reading of the label might correct such impression.”108
The court based its reasoning upon the “common observation” that the average consumer does not carefully
analyze labels, but “contents himself with a hasty glace or cursory examination.”109
106Hall-Baker Grain Co. v. United States, 198 F. 614, 617 (8th Cir. 1912), overruling United States v. Hall-Baker Grain Co.,
Notice of Judgment No. 1135, in U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 14, at 452. The Eight Circuit was unclear
on whether its factual ruling was based on a factual ﬁnding on the lack of intent to mislead on the part of the manufacturer
(since the cause of the false label was by the actions of a third party), or that the deceit did not cause injury, or that by law
an invoice accompanying the product was not a label, therefore there was no violation.
107United States v. Von Bremen, Notice of Judgment No. 1949 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1910), in U.S. Department of Agriculture,
supra note 14, at 347, 348 – 49.
108United States v. Ten Barrels of Vinegar, 186 F. 399, 401 (E.D. Wisc. 1911). See e.g. United States v. Harper, Notice of
Judgment No. 25, at 4, in U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 14, at 163, 164.
109U.S. v. Ten Barrels of Vinegar, 186 F. at 401. In the context of drug misbranding, this standard was limited in an opinion
21The ﬁrst case to be decided by the Supreme Court under the 1906 Act severely limited the scope of section 8’s
prohibitions on misbranding. The Court held that section 8 was “aimed not at all possible false statements,
but only at such as determine the identity of the article.”110 The Sherley Amendment later ﬁlled this gap
by amending section 8, in the case of drugs, by adding a third paragraph stating that an article is deemed
misbranded if “its package or label shall bear or contain any statement, design, or device regarding the
curative or therapeutic eﬀect of such article or any of the ingredients or substances contained therein, which
is false and fraudulent.”111
The Act provided that the enforcement of the law should begin on Jan. 1, 1907, thus giving six months
to formulate the necessary rules and regulations.112 It also provided that the Bureau of Chemistry, the
predecessor of the modern FDA,113 was to be the enforcing agency of the Act, but regulations could only be
established by the joint action of the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce, thus ensuring
that regulations would be slow in the creation, and compromised when ﬁnally promulgated.114 Nevertheless,
on Oct. 17, 1906, the Secretaries of the Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce and Labor adopted forty
“Rules and Regulations for the Enforcement of the Food and Drugs Act, June 30, 1906.”115
The implementation of the 1906 Act was “embroiled in controversy” almost from its enactment.116 Fostered
written by Judge Hand, as a district court judge in New York, in which he held that in determining misbranding, the audience
to whom the product was intended is relevant. In this case, the label was “intended to be read and to be understood by men who
were in the drug business, and so you must consider whether within commercial meaning” whether the label was misleading.
United States v. J.L. Hopkins & Co., Notice of Judgment 1881, at 9 (1912), in U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra
note 14, at 528, 536.
110United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 497 (1911).
111Act of August 23, 1912, ch. 352, 37 Stat. 416. Note that the same amendment was not made as regarding the misbranding
provision for food, since by the deﬁnition of drug, any “substance or mixture of substances intended to be sued for the cure,
mitigation, or prevention of disease” was a drug and not a food, Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, therefore
any such health claims transformed the product into a “drug.” See infra Part IV.
112Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, ch. 3915 § 13, 34 Stat. 768.
113The Bureau of Chemistry administered the 1906 Act until the Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration was established
in 1927, which was renamed in 1930 as the FDA. Hutt & Hutt, supra note 31, at 49 n.386.
114C.C. Regier, The Struggle for Federal Food and Drugs Legislation, 1 Law & Contemp Probs. 3 (1933); Lauﬀer T. Hayes &
Frank J. Ruﬀ, The Administration of the Federal Food and Drugs Act, 1 Law & Contemp. Probs. 16 (1933).
115A copy of these regulations as amended by 1914, appear in U.S. Department of Agriculture, supra note 14, at 17 – 31.
116Hutt & Hutt, supra note 31, 55 – 57.
22by the lobbying of food producers, the Department of Agriculture’s policies and goals conﬂicted with those
of its underling, the Bureau of Chemistry,117 resulting in “the fundamental principles of the Pure Food Law
hav[ing] been strangled.”118 The lack of judicial precedent to guide agency action, and the length of time
necessary to have a court issue an interpretation further exacerbated these problems.119
B.
Misbranding under the FDCA
The FDCA, enacted in 1938, did not change the basis of the 1906 Act standards120 – the adulteration and
misbranding of food were still prohibited – and these statutory prohibitions are currently still the same.121
But the 1938 Act unquestionably expanded the power and authority of the FDA. Speciﬁcally, in regards to
labeling, the 1938 Act removed the burden from the FDA of proving knowledge or intent in misbranding
cases.122
The FDCA as enacted, in terms of misbranding, is almost the same today as in 1938.123 Most simply, under
117For a detailed account of the “abrogation of the Food Law” by the Chief of the Bureau of Chemistry until his resignation
in 1912, see Harvey W. Wiley, History of a Crime Against the Food Law 98 – 153 (1929). See also Hayes & Ruﬀ, supra
note 114, at 21 – 23.
118From the Rocky Mountain News, March 21, 1912, available in Wiley, supra note 117, at 95.
119Wilson, supra note 16, at 56. Relatively few cases interpreting the 1906 Act ever reached the Supreme Court, leaving
unanswered some conﬂicting decisions from lower federal courts. Id. Wilson also noted that at least in one instance the
decisions of district courts within the same circuit were also inconsistent. The exact same product with the same label was
held misbranded in United States v. Scanlon, 180 F. 485 (N.D. Ohio 1908) and not misbranded in United States v. 68 Cases
of Syrup, 172 F. 781 (E.D. Ill. 1909). Id.
120For a discussion of some of the proposed amendments concerning labeling requirements prior to the passage of the 1938
act, see Hutt & Hutt, supra note 31, 58 – 59.
121Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, c. 675, §§ 301(a), (b), (g), 52 Stat. 1040, 1042 – 43 (1938); 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a),
(b), (g) (2000).
122This change has been criticized, as “thereby theoretically giving the FDA the right to tyranny.” Scott Lucas, The FDA
4 (1978). Intent is still relevant in felony prosecutions under § 303(b) of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. §333(b) (2000). See U.S. v.
Arlen, 947 F.2d 139, 141 – 43 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that intent under § 303(b) does not necessarily only mean the intent to
defraud or mislead the purchaser, but can include the intent to mislead a government agency).
123Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, c. 675, §§ 201(k), (m), (n), 52 Stat. 1040, 1040 – 42 (1938) (codiﬁed as amended
at 21 U.S.C. § 321(k), (m), (n)(2000)). In 1976, “or advertising” was inserted after “labeling” wherever appearing within
subsection (n), in order to extend the application of the factors to consider in regards to misbranding to drugs, corresponding
with the 1962 amendments that authorized the FDA to regulate drug advertising. Act of Apr. 22, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-278,
23section 403(a), a food is misbranded if “its labeling is false or misleading in any particular,”124 or if it does
not contain certain information on its label or in its labeling.125
Under the FDCA, the term “false” has its usual meaning of “untruthful,” while the term “misleading” has
become a term of art.126 Misbranding still reaches not only false claims, but also those claims that might
be technically true, but still misleading.127 If any one representation in the labeling is misleading, then the
entire food is misbranded, nor can any other statement in the labeling cure another misleading statement.128
Misleading is judged in reference to “the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.”129 It is not necessary
§ 502, 90 Stat 401.
12421 U.S.C. § 343(a) (2000).
125Additionally, a food is misbranded if:
(1) If it is oﬀered for sale under the name of another food,
(2) If it is an imitation of another food and is not labeled as such,
(3) If the container is misleading (i.e., as to sizing),
(4) If the label does not identify the supplier, the statement of quantity, either as weight, measure, or numerical count [see
21 C.F.R. §§ 101.5 & 101.7],
(5) If any disclosure required is not placed prominently and conspicuously [see 21 C.F.R. § 101.15],
(6) If there is a standard of identity, it must so comply,
(7) If it is represented to be a standard of quality as per regulations,
(8) If the food is not represented by a standard of identity, then the label must have the common or usual name of the food,
and a list of ingredients if fabricated form two or more ingredients [see 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.3 & 101.4],
(9) If the food claims to be for special dietary uses, the label must have certain information according to the regulations [see
21 C.F.R. § 105],
(10) If artiﬁcial ﬂavorings, artiﬁcial colorings or chemical preservatives are used but not so labeled [see 21 C.F.R. § 101.22],
and
(11) If the label fails to bear the speciﬁc information that the FDA requires.
21 U.S.C. § 343(b) – (k), (q) (2000). There are additional requirements for speciﬁc products. For example, saccharin must be
labeled with a congressionally negotiated cancer warning; the absence of such is a misbranding violation. 21 U.S.C. § 343(o)(1).
For a summary of what is aﬃrmatively required on the label, and details on size and placement of this information, see Vetter,
supra note 90, at 67 – 108; FDA, A Food Labeling Guide, supra note 9.
126See, e.g., V. E. Irons, Inc. v. Unites States, 244 F.2d 34, 43 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957) (“[A] representation
may be ’misleading’ from the very fact of overemphasis and exaggeration, even though the product in question may be helpful,
and in some circumstances useful, though not really indispensable to good health.”).
127See, e.g., V. E. Irons, Inc. v. Unites States, 244 F.2d at 42 (“Bearing in mind the broad remedial purposes of the Act in
preventing deception, the Congress must be taken to have meant to strike not only at palpably false claims but also at clever
indirection and ambiguity in the creation of misleading impressions.”).
128See, e.g., U.S. v. Hoxsey Cancer Clinic, 198 F.2d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 928 (1953) (rejecting
the defendant’s argument that the booklets as a whole disclaim any speciﬁc claim of eﬃcacy) (“It was not necessary for the
Government to prove that each and every representation in the booklet was false or misleading.”).
129See, e.g., United States v. Strauss, 999 F.2d 692, 696 (2nd Cir. 1993) (“It also is irrelevant that a reasonable consumer
reading the labels would realize that all Professional Choice varieties, and indeed all other dog foods, contain roughly the same
ingredients and that the artiﬁcial ﬂavoring adds no nutritional value to the dog food. We have construed section 343 broadly,
since the test is not the eﬀect of the label on a reasonable consumer, but upon ‘the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous’
consumer.”); United States v. El-O-Pathic Pharmacy, 192 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1951) (“The Act as a whole was designed primarily
to protect consumers from dangerous products; its purpose is to protect the public, the vast multitude which includes the
ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous who, when making a purchase, do not stop to analyze.”). Compare V. E. Irons,
Inc. v. Unites States, 244 F.2d at 39 – 40 (“In determining whether such labeling contained ’false or misleading’ statements,
we must be careful not to read the literature with the eyes either of experts in nutrition or of overly skeptical buyers. What is
24to prove anyone was actually mislead.130
Overall, the FDA has pursued a high standard of consumer protection under the FDCA,131 and courts have
generally upheld this standard.132 Additionally, courts often defer to the FDA in deﬁning the terms “false”
or “misleading.”
In implementing the 1938 Act, there was an initial emphasis at the FDA on preventing economic adulteration
– the reduction in value of a food by using a less valuable material in the composition of the food, such
as diluting orange juice with water.133 But economic adulteration was not that easy to deﬁne in practice,
especially with advances in food science and technology. Thus, the misbranding provisions took the lead
position in how the FDA chose to monitor economic adulteration, allowing consumers to protect themselves
by relying on truthful labeling.134
As the public became more aware of the connection between diet and health, nutrition labeling became
a priority of the FDA.135 In response to this new consumer interest, the food industry started developing
“healthier” products, and enhancing the labeling to emphasize the health beneﬁts of a certain product. At
this time, there were no standard deﬁnitions of terms such as “low” and “free,” thus necessitating more FDA
pertinent is the eﬀect the claims would have on those to whom they are addressed, namely, prospective purchasers and actual
customers of appellants, who cannot be presumed to have special expertness or to be unduly cautious, but who are more likely
than not to be persons who are pathetically eager to ﬁnd some simple cure-all for the diseases with which they are aﬄicted or
who are susceptible to luridly painted scare literature as to the prospect of being disease-ridden unless they consistently partake
of the vaunted drug product.”).
130See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Food Labeled Nuclomin, 482 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1973).
131Samia N. Rodriguez, Food Labeling Requirements, in Fundamentals of Law and Regulation 254 (Robert P. Brady et
al. eds, 1997).
132See, e.g., U.S. v. An Article of Drug ...Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969) (“[R]emedial legislation such as the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to be given a liberal construction consistent with the Act’s overriding purpose to protect the public
health.”); United States v. An Article of Food Labeled Nuclomin, 482 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1973) (recognizing the overriding
purpose of the FDCA, the court held that the FDA has authority to condemn a product for a misleading label, even though
the label was technically accurate); United States v. An Article of Food ...“Manischewitz ...Diet Thins,” 377 F. Supp. 746
(E.D.N.Y. 194); United States v. An Article of Food Consisting of 432 Cartons ...Candy Lollipops, 292 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
133See Vetter, supra note 90, at 11.
134Id.
135This new public interest in the relationship of diet and health was due to a number of factors: advances in nutrition and
medical research; the White House Conference on Foods, Nutrition, and Health in 1969 recommendation for producers to fortify
foods; the publication of the 1977 Report on Dietary Goals for the United States by the Senate’s Select Committee on Nutrition
and Human Needs. Id. at 13 – 16.
25interference, since the marketplace “became a jungle again,”136 with the proliferation of claims for healthier
products. In the early 1970s, the FDA refocused its approach away from case-by-case law enforcement in the
courts, which predominated prior to the 1970s, to rulemaking.137 In October 1977, Commissioner Donald
Kennedy also announced that the FDA would seek tighter controls on labeling and advertising, not just
through stricter regulations, but also by seeking additional legislation.138
Despite this announcement, there was much criticism of the FDA and its enforcement policy, or lack of en-
forcement policy. Even industry participants did not take FDA seizure threats very seriously. For example,
in the early 1990s, under Commissioner David Kessler, the FDA threatened to seize thousands of cases of
Proctor & Gamble’s Citrus Hill orange juice, for being misleading because the word “fresh” appeared on the
label, although the juice was made from concentrate.139 Proctor & Gamble did not respond, for, as in the
past, it believed the FDA would simply send a regulatory letter. Commissioner Kessler, newly appointed to
his post, said “[t]he time has come to end the din of mixed messages and partial truths on food labels,”140
thus signaling the new focus of FDA enforcement actions against mislabeling.
To aid the FDA’s goal of a stricter policy, the Nutrition and Labeling Education Act (NLEA) was enacted
in 1990, which established additional aﬃrmative requirements for labeling and more strictly regulated nu-
trient claims.141 Congress’s goal was that of enabling consumers to make informed decisions from accurate
136Id. at 15.
137Lucas, supra note 122, at 122 – 26.
138See Lucas, supra note 122, at 38.
139See Herbert Burkholz, The FDA Follies 179 – 82 (1994).
140Warren E. Leary, Citing Labels, U.S. Seizes Orange Juice, New York Times, April 25, 1991, at A18.
141Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codiﬁed in part at 21 U.S.C. § 343).
For a discussion on how the NLEA aﬀected health claims, see infra Part IV.
26information.142 The major changes of the NLEA are as follows:143 (1) The NLEA added § 403(q), which
requires nutrition labeling for virtually all FDA regulated food products in a uniform format; (2) The NLEA
added § 403(r), which prohibits the use of a “nutrient descriptor” or “nutrient content claim” – a claim that
characterizes the level of a nutrient present in a food such as “low calorie” or “high ﬁber” – unless the FDA
has deﬁned it and the use conforms with that deﬁnition; (3) Section 403(r) also prohibits disease prevention
claims – such as a claim that a product “helps to reduce the risk of heart disease” – in food labeling unless
it conforms with a regulation promulgated by the FDA. If an unapproved health claims is used, even if
truthful, then the article is deemed misbranded.144
The stricter controls sought by the FDA in the early 1990s were minimized by the enactment of the Food
and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA).145 The FDAMA allowed certain nutrient
content claims to be made if based on an “authoritative statement,”146 thus again expanding the freedom
of labelers.
142See Vetter, supra note 90, at 18. A prior amendment of the FDCA was the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966.
Its stated purpose was similar to that of the NLEA, to prevent deceptive and unfair business practices by requiring honest and
informative labeling in consumers commodities generally. Fair Packaging and Labeling Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-755, §2, 80
Stat. 1296, (codiﬁed as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (2000)). Section 2 provides that:
Informed consumers are essential to the fair and eﬃcient functioning of a free market economy. Packages and their labels
should enable consumers to obtain accurate information as to the quantity of the contents and should facilitate value compar-
isons. Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress to assist consumers and manufacturers in reaching these
goals in the marketing of consumer goods.
But the only provision not already applicable to food under the 1938 Act was the uniform location requirement on the
principal display panel in a speciﬁed type size of the net quantity of contents.
143See, e.g., Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 200 – 203 (2nd ed. 1991).
144The eﬀect of the NLEA on health claims is discussed infra Part IV.A.
145Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325.
146“Authoritative statements” are deﬁned further infra Part IV.B.
27C.
Misbranding under the FTC Act
In 1938, the FTC Act was amended. Before then, the FTC could only protect consumers indirectly by
protecting competitors, since the FTC Act section 5, as originally enacted in 1914, only prohibited “unfair
methods of competition in commerce.” While the deﬁnition of “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” was
left generally to case law, in 1938 section 12 was also added, providing that the dissemination of any false
advertising in connection with the purchase of foods or drugs is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within
section 5’s prohibition.147 Section 15(a) contains the deﬁnition of false advertisement for the purposes of
section 12, limiting section 12’s application to “an advertisement, other than labeling, which is misleading in
a material respect.”148 The distinction between sections 5 and 12 of the FTC Act was originally based upon
the remedy available. Section 12 provided for injunctive relief. Statutory amendments in 1973 provided the
FTC with general injunctive powers, thus eliminating the need to rely on section 12.149
The terms “unfair” and “deceptive” of section 5, although similar, are not identical, and there are no statu-
147Section 12 “False advertising; dissemination prohibited,” provides as follows:
(a) Unlawfulness. It shall be unlawful for any person ...to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement
–
(1) By United States mails, or in or having an eﬀect upon commerce, by any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which
is likely to induce, directly or indirectly the purchase of foods, drugs, devices, services, or cosmetics; or
(2) By any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly, the purchase in or having
an eﬀect upon commerce of food, drugs, devices, services, or cosmetics.
(b) Unfair or deceptive act or practice. The dissemination or the causing to be disseminated of any false advertisement
within the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be an unfair or deceptive act or practice in or aﬀecting commerce
within the meaning of section 5.
15 U.S.C. § 52 (2000).
148Section 15(a)(1) provides:
The term “false advertisement” means an advertisement, other than labeling, which is misleading in a material respect;
and in determining whether any advertisement is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only
representations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, sound, or any combination thereof, but also the extent to
which the advertisement fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations or material with respect to consequences
which may result form the use of the commodity to which the advertisement relates under the conditions prescribed in said
advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or usual.
15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (2000).
149Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, §408, 87 Stat. 591 (1973) (codiﬁed at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(1),
45 (m), 53(b), 53(c)).
28tory deﬁnitions as to either. The legal standards used by the FTC concerning deception are fairly well
established, while the standards for unfairness are still in a comparatively recent state of development. The
basic approach by the FTC for evaluating food advertising claims is that claims must be (1) adequately
substantiated, and (2) not deceptive.
Adequate Substantiation. The FTC requires a “reasonable basis” to adequately substantiate advertising
claims, and the absence of a reasonable basis has been held to violate section 5 under both deception150 and
unfairness151 theories. Implied representations must also be adequate substantiated.152
What constitutes a reasonable basis depends on a number of factors “relevant to the beneﬁts and costs of
substantiating a particular claim.”153 These factors include: (1) the type of product advertised, (2) the type
of claim, (3) the beneﬁts of a truthful claim, (4) the ease of developing substantiation for the claim, (5)
the consequences of a false claim, and (6) the amount of substantiation that experts in the ﬁeld believe is
reasonable.154 The issue of adequate substantiation is considered separately from the technical accuracy of
the claim.155
The advertiser must be able to prove that ex ante, he had a reasonable basis prior to the advertisement. This
is not an easy evidentiary burden, but a written report, drafted in good faith prior to marketing, setting
150The deception is the implicit representation of prior objective veriﬁcation, and the absence of such veriﬁcation is misleading.
See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. F.T.C., 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); National
Commission on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 89 (1976), enforced as modiﬁed, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
821 (1978).
151See, e.g., In re Pﬁzer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 72 – 73 (1972)
152See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 603 – 04 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Figgie frequently argues that some of
the representations that the Commission found false or misleading were implied, not express. This is a distinction without
a diﬀerence. Figgie can point to nothing in statute or case law which protects from liability those who merely imply their
deceptive claims; there is no such loophole.”). Substantiating implied claims can become circular, for example, when scientiﬁc
studies are cited in an advertisement as a basis for one claim, but no studies are cited for another technical representation, the
FTC could argue that the advertisement contains a materially misleading implication that adequate substantiation exists for
all of the claims made. See, e.g., Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1493 (1974), aﬀ’d, per curiam by unpublished
order of the court, (D.C. Cir. 1976).
153FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,999, 104 F.T.C. 648, 839 (1984) (appended
to Thompson Medical Co., Inc.).
154FTC Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, supra note 153.
155The existence of substantiation for a claim will not shield the advertiser from liability if additional substantial evidence
proves the claim nevertheless to be false. National Dynamics Corp., 82 F.T.C. 488 (19733), aﬀ’d on other grounds and
remanded, 492 F.2d 1333 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 419 (U.S. 993) (1974).
29forth the evidentiary basis, should aid in proving such.156 The subjective good faith is not conclusive, for
the reasonableness of the advertiser’s reliance on the substantiating data will be measured against the degree
of substantiation reasonably consumers would expect.157
Deception.158 In the early 1980s, the FTC issued a new policy statement outlining its standards for deter-
mining when an advertising claim will be found to be deceptive.159 Prior to then, the deception standard
was that any statement that had the tendency and capacity to mislead or deceive a prospective purchaser
was a deceptive practice within the meaning of the FTC Act prohibitions.160 The FTC reconsidered this
deﬁnition, for it found this deﬁnition to be “circular and therefore inadequate to provide guidance on how
a deception claims should be analyzed.”161 The revised standard will ﬁnd an act or practice deceptive if,
“ﬁrst, there is a representation, omission, or practice that, second, is likely to mislead consumers acting
reasonably under the circumstances, and, third, the representation, omission, or practice is material.”162
Thus the focus shifted from advertising that had a “tendency and capacity to deceive” to advertising that
is “likely to mislead,” from simply “consumers” to “consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances,”
and to include a requirement of materiality.163
156In re Pﬁzer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 72 – 73 (1972) (“[R]espondent made no written report setting forth the actions which were
taken to support the existence of a reasonable basis for its advertising claims. Such a report, if made in good faith prior to
marketing, if reasonable in scope and approach, and if reasonably clear as to the evidentiary basis for the speciﬁc claims in
question (be they scientiﬁc tests, speciﬁed medical references, or speciﬁc clinical evidence), would certainly have, in itself, gone
a considerable distance in demonstrating the existence of a reasonable basis for their aﬃrmative product claims.”).
157See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972), aﬀ’d, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
158See generally FTC’s Authority Over Deceptive Advertising: Hearing Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong. 2d Sess (1982); Deception: FTC Oversight: Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong, 2d Sess (1984).
159FTC Policy Statement on Deception, 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984) (appended to Cliﬀdale Associates, Inc.). The Cliﬀdale As-
sociates decision was the ﬁrst case applying the new deception standard and thus the policy statement was appended to the
decision, but the new policy was ﬁrst articulated in a letter to The Honorable John D. Dingell, Chairman, Committee on Energy
and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, dated Oct. 14, 1983.
160See Chrysler Corp. v. F.T.C., 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977); F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934);
Charles of The Ritz Corp. v. F.T.C., 143 F.2d 676 (2nd Cir. 1944).
161FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 159, at 164.
162Id. at 164 – 65.
163For cases under this new policy, see generally, F.T.C. v. Pantron I Corp., 22 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1794 (1995); Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909 (1993); F.T.C. v. Silueta
Distrib., Inc., 1995-1 Trade Case (CCH) ¶70,918 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Stouﬀer Foods Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶23,686
(1994).
30The advertiser’s intent to deceive is not relevant, for the FTC Act is concerned with protecting the public
from deception rather than punishing the violator.164 The omission of material information, even if the
representations are entirely truthful, may be determined to be deceptive and therefore a violation of sec-
tion 5.165 Advertisements are viewed from the vantage of a consumer, and that of the ordinary consumer.
While courts have held that the audience will be assumed to include “the ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous, 166 the FTC has softened this approach in enforcement, requiring consumers to act reasonably
in the circumstances.167 Misleadingness is judged on the entirety of the ad, and not based upon a particu-
lar claim.168 Puﬃng is allowed, but the dividing line between puﬃng and misleading claims is not bright:
puﬃng is permitted as long as the manufacture speaks generally of his product’s high quality, but not as to
speciﬁc claims. The deception of an actual consumer need not be proved, just that that the advertisement
164See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934); Porter & Dietsch, Inc. v. F.T.C., 605 F.2d 294 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963).
165See, e.g., Simeon Management Corp. v. F.T.C., 579 F.2d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Failure to disclose material
information may cause an advertisement to be false or deceptive within the meaning of the FTCA even though the advertisement
does not state false facts.”); Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C., 738 F.2d 554, at 563 (2d Cir.1984); Katharine Gibbs School v. F.T.C.,
612 F.2d 658, 665 (2nd Cir. 1979); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 81 F.T.C. 398 (1972), aﬀ’d, 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973); In re Stupell Enters., 67 F.T.C. 173 (1965); In re Universe Co., 63 F.T.C. 1282 (1963), aﬀ’d, sub
nom, Kirchner v. F.T.C., 337 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1964); In re Novel Mgf. Corp., 60 F.T.C. 1748 (1962); In re Nuclear Prods.
Co., 49 F.T.C. 229 (1952); In re Fisher & Deritis, 49 F.T.C. 77 (1952).
166See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Standard Educ. Soc’y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937) (“The fact that a false statement may be obviously
false to those who are trained and experienced does not change its character, nor take away its power to deceive others less
experienced. There is no duty resting upon a citizen to suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business. Laws are
made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious. The best element of business has long since decided that honesty should
govern competitive enterprises, and that the rule of caveat emptor should not be relied upon to reward fraud and deception.”);
F.T.C. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2nd Cir. 1963) (“Unlike that abiding faith which the law has in the ‘reasonable
man,’ it has very little faith indeed in the intellectual acuity of the ‘ordinary purchaser’ who is the object of the advertising
campaign.”) quoting 1 Callman, Unfair Competition and Trademarks § 19.2(a)(1), at 341-44 (1950):
The general public has been deﬁned as ‘that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, and unthinking and the credulous,
who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and general impressions.’ The
average purchaser has been variously characterized as not ‘straight thinking,’ subject to ‘impressions,’ uneducated, and grossly
misinformed; he is inﬂuenced by prejudice and superstition; and he wishfully believes in miracles, allegedly the result of progress
in science.... The language of the ordinary purchaser is casual and unaﬀected. He is not an ‘expert in grammatical construction’
or an ‘educated analytical reader’ and, therefore, he does not normally subject every word in the advertisement to careful study.
167FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 161.
168See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Standard Educ. Soc’y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 – 17 (1937); Food Motor Co. v. F.T.C., 120 F.2d 175 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 668 (1941); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. F.T.C., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2nd Cir. 1963) (“It is therefore
necessary in these cases to consider the advertisement in its entirety and not to engage in disputatious dissection. The entire
mosaic should be viewed rather than each tile separately. ’The buying public does not ordinarily carefully study or weigh each
word in an advertisement. The ultimate impression upon the mind of the reader arises from the sum total of not only what is
said but also of all that is reasonably implied.”).
31in question was likely to mislead.169 Nor is the fact that in actuality the majority of consumers were not
deceived a defense.170
Recently, the FTC has increasingly used consumer surveys and such objective evidence as proof of the likeli-
ness to mislead.171 But the determination is ultimately one the Commission makes, based on its own visual
inspection and interpretation of the advertising.172 Overcoming an adverse FTC determination on the likeli-
ness to mislead is a fairly high hurdle. Courts often give great deference to the FTC’s judgment on whether
an advertisement contains representations or omissions that might be deceptive, on what representations are
explicitly and implicitly conveyed, and if these representations are material.173 This deference is partially
169See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934); Beneﬁcial Corp. v. F.T.C., 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3rd Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 938 (1977) (“[T]he FTC has been sustained in ﬁnding that advertising is misleading even absent evidence
of that actual eﬀect on customers, the likelihood or propensity of deception is the criterion by which advertising is measured.
...At the same time, evidence that some customers actually misunderstood the thrust of the message is signiﬁcant support for
the ﬁnding of a tendency to mislead.”); National Commission on Egg Nutrition v. F.T.C., 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. F.T.C., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2nd Cir. 1963) (“In order best to implement the
prophylactic purpose of the statute, it has been consistently held that advertising falls within its proscription not only when
there is proof of actual deception but also when the representations made have a capacity or tendency to deceive, i.e., when
there is a likelihood or fair probability that the reader will be misled.”); Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. F.T.C., 143
F.2d 676, 680 (2nd Cir. 1944).
170See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. F.T.C., 481 F.2d 246 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1112 (1973).
171See, e.g., Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909 (1993); In re Thompson Medical
Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984); Stouﬀer Foods Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶23,686 (1994). Advertisements directed
to a speciﬁc segment of consumers will be judge with respect to that group, including advertising directed to children. See,
e.g., ITT Continental Baking Co., Inv. v. F.T.C., 532 F.2d 207 (2nd Cir. 1976); Wand Labs., Inc. v. F.T.C., 276 F.2d
952 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827; In re Topper Corp., 79 F.T.C. 681 (1971). For a Comparison of the FTC use of
consumer surveys with the FDA’s apparent lack of use, see Manoj Hastak, et. al, The Role of Consumer Surveys in Public
Policy Decision Making, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 170 (2001). According to this article, the FTC relies on
surveys sometimes to assess whether an advertising or marketing practice is deceptive, and as evidence during litigation. The
FTC frequently uses surveys when an implied claim is at issue, the FTC does not typically use surveys when it believes that
the claims are express. In these cases, the FTC usually relies on a marketing expert to evaluate the deceptiveness. Contrast
this with the FDA, which rarely uses survey evidence, relying instead on its expertise to make a determination as to a claim’s
misleadingness. Id.
172See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965) (sustaining the ﬁndings of fact of the Commission that
rested on inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the commercials themselves); ITT Continental Baking Co. v. F.T.C.,
532 F.2d 207 (2nd Cir. 1976); Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909 (1993) (“[T]he
Commission may rely upon its own reasoned analysis to determine what claims, including implied ones, are conveyed in a
challenged advertisement, so long as those claims are reasonably clear from the face of the advertisement.”)
173See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (“This Statutory scheme necessarily gives the Com-
mission an inﬂuential role in interpreting § 5 and in applying it to the facts of particular cases arising out of unprecedented
situations. Moreover, as an administrative agency which deals continually with cases in the Area, the Commission is often
in a better position than are courts to determine when a practice is ‘deceptive’ within the meaning of the Act. This Court
has frequently stated that the Commission’s judgment is to be given great weight by reviewing courts. This admonition is
especially true with respect to allegedly deceptive advertising since the ﬁnding of a § 5 violation in this ﬁled rests so heavily
on inference and pragmatic judgment.”); Beneﬁcial Corp. v. F.T.C., 542 F.2d 611, 617 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
938 (1977) (“Whether particular advertising has a tendency to deceive or mislead is obviously an impressionistic determination
more closely akin to a ﬁnding of fact than to a conclusion of law.”); F.T.C. v. Figgie Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1993);
Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 909 (1993); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. F.T.C., 741 F.2d
32based upon the accumulated agency expertise.174 Additionally, advertisements that might be found to be
misleading, “should be construed against the advertiser.”175
D.
Comparison of the FDA & FTC Standards and Interagency Action
The deﬁnition of misleading advertising in section 15(a)(1) of the FTC Act is nearly identical to the deﬁni-
tion of misleading labeling in section 201(n) of the FDCA. The conference report accompanying the FDCA
enactment indicates that the two sections were intended to have the same meaning.176 However, there are a
few statutory diﬀerences. Misbranding under the FDA is easier to prove in that the FDCA only requires the
labeling to be “false or misleading in any particular,” while the FTC must show that misleading statement
is materially misleading.177
1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985) (“It is within the Commission’s expertise to determine what
inferences consumers may draw from such representations. ...We defer to that expertise and aﬃrm the conclusion that Bayer
was advertised to have scientiﬁcally established therapeutic superiority.”). Compare Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer
Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 661, 677 – 79 (1977) (explaining the “virtually unreviewable”
discretion of the FTC in interpreting advertisements because of the “administrative inconvenience of alternative approaches”
rather than because of the FTC’s expertise).
174Simeon Management Corp. v. F.T.C., 579 F.2d 1137, 1145 – 46 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The Commission has been engaged in
making such determinations since 1938, when its jurisdiction was extended to include the prevention of unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce. As a result, the Commission has accumulated extensive experience and is therefore generally in a
better position than the courts to determine when a practice is deceptive within the meaning of the FTCA.”).
175Resort Car Rental Systems, Inc. v. F.T.C., 518 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975). See also United
States v. Ninety-Five Barrels, 265 U.S. 438 (1924); Giant Food, Inc. v. F.T.C., 322 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1963); cert. dismissed,
376 U.S. 967 (1964).
176H.R. Rep. No. 75-2139, at 3 (3rd Sess. 1938). See also 83 Cong. Rec. 3255 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1938) (statement of Sen.
Wheeler).
177See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Food Consisting of 432 Cartons ...Candy Lollipops, 292 F. Supp. 839, 840 –
41 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“[W]e recognize that the statute [FDCA] does not provide for much ﬂexibility in interpretation...Since it
requires only that the labeling be false or misleading ‘in any particular.’ This represents a stricter substantive standard than
that applied with respect to false advertising, which in order to be prohibited must be ‘misleading in a material respect.”’). For
comparison, in one case recently under the felony provisions of the FDCA, 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit held that
the “intent to mislead” requirement of the felony provisions also requires proof of materiality. U.S. v. Watkins, 278 F.3d 961,
966 – 69 (“[O]ne still cannot ‘intend to mislead’ another by means of a misrepresentation without having an expectation that
the recipient would actually or reasonably rely on it.”). Compare U.S. v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550 (8th Cir. 1998) (addressing
33For the most part, the agencies have pursued similar deﬁnitions of misbranding. But the FDA holds labeling
to a higher standard than the FTC, for the FDA attempts to protect the ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous from being mislead, while the FTC, under its enforcement policy, will only protect the consumers
who are acting reasonably under the circumstances.
The method by which these agencies act is also diﬀerent. The FTC acts primarily by adjudication, rather
than rulemaking.178 The FDA’s current focus is on rulemaking, even though it has the power to seize mis-
branding articles and pursue policy individually.
Despite these diﬀerences, there is a high-level of interaction between the FTC and the FDA. The FTC has
traditionally used the expertise of the FDA when evaluating advertising claims for FDA-regulated prod-
ucts.179 The FTC often relies on an advertiser’s compliance FDA labeling regulations when it determines
whether advertising claims are false or deceptive.180 Additionally, the FTC also speciﬁcally allows the use of
“safe-harbor” provisions in certain circumstances, which aﬃrmatively allows a manufacturer to make claims
that are sanctioned by other governmental agencies.181 This reliance on regulations is not always the FTC
relying on FDA regulations. In United States v. Strauss, the Second Circuit rejected the argument that the
FDCA criminal provision prohibiting mislabeling was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to dog food
sold sellers, notwithstanding the lack of FDA guidelines or regulations governing dog food labeling, since the
a similar felony misbranding provision of the Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601 – 695, that requires an “intent to
defraud,” and holding that the statute does not require the false or misleading statements to be material.)
178A treatise on the Law of Advertising has notes that “the Federal Trade Commission indicated that it would consider
proposing regulations governing food advertising after the publication of the FDA’s ﬁnal rules on food labeling” but as of yet,
these regulations have not materialized. Rosden & Rosden, supra note 153, at 26 – 41 n.39.
179Working Agreement Between Federal Trade Commission and Food and Drug Administration, supra note 66 at ¶ 9850.01.
180Simeon Management Corp. v. F.T.C., 579 F.2d 1137, 1145 – 46 (9th Cir. 1978) (upholding the FTC determination that the
failure to disclose that the drug involved lacked FDA approval for such use renders the advertisement deceptive and therefore
in violation of section 5); Removation Int’l Corp. v. F.T.C., 884 F.2d 1489 (1st Cir. 1989); Thompson Medical Co. v. F.T.C.,
791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987); Bristol-Myers Co. v. F.T.C. 738 F.2d 554 (2nd Cir. 1984),
cert. denied 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); American Home Products Corp. v. F.T.C. 695 F.2d 681 (3rd Cir. 1982).
181See, e.g., Gracewood Fruit Co., [1993-1997 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,359 (1993) (proposed consent)
(safe harbor provisions allows health claims made for consuming grapefruit that are permitted on labels by the FDA under
the NLEA); Clorox Co. [1987-1993 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep (CCH) ¶23,269 (1992) (consent) (order prohibiting
misrepresentations regarding fat and cholesterol content of salad dressing did not prohibit claims speciﬁcally permitted by the
FDA in labeling).
34FTC had promulgated regulations expressly prohibiting misrepresentations of a dog food’s suitability for a
particular purpose.182
At times, the FTC adopts the ﬁndings of the FDA to reach its own ﬁnding that an ad was false or de-
ceptive.183 There is some concern at the FTC, though, of relying too much on the FDA. In Commissioner
Owen’s dissent to a proposed consent order, she stated that “In taking this action today, I believe that the
Commission has essentially ceded its authority to the FDA.”184
FTC enforcement has recently become more important to the FDA as the resources of the FDA are depleted.
The FDA’s budget has been persistently too minimal, and Congress has not authorized suﬃcient funds for
the FDA to fully police this area.185 Recently, the sale of misleadingly labeled products has been downplayed
at the FDA due to budgetary constraints, and the FDA has increasingly been forced to rely upon the FTC
to combat minor-scale fraud in otherwise traditionally FDA-regulated ﬁelds.186
182United States v. Strauss, 999 F.2d 692 (2nd Cir. 1993). The FTC has subsequently revoked these regulations.
183Simeon Mortgage Corp. v. F.T.C., 579 F.2d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 1978) (“The FTC did not independently determine that
HCG is a new drug when used for the treatment of obesity. It merely declined to challenge the FDA determination because
the record before it lacked substantial evidence that HCG is eﬀective for such use. Petitioners do not, and indeed could not,
dispute the fact that the FDA has declared HCG to be a new drug when used for the treatment of obesity. The Commission’s
acceptance of the FDA determination is supported by the applicable legal precedents and substantial evidence on the record as
a whole, and hence cannot be set aside.”); Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc. [1983-1987 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶
22,313 (1985) (ﬁnding of FDA substantiated respondent’s comparative advertising claims).
184Metagenics, Inc., [1993-1997 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,650 (1994) (dissent criticizing the Commission
actions because “on balance, it runs contrary to the public interest. I fear that the breadth of the allegations in the administrative
complaint may convey the wrong message to the public and thereby discourage not only truthful and nondeceptive claims about
calcium supplements but, ultimately, their use.”).
185See O’Reilly, supra note 6, §24.02 & §10.08.50 (cumulative supplement).
186Id.; FTC Consent Order with Karr Preventative Medical Products Inc., 44 Fed. Reg. 39191 (July 5, 1979). See also,
Dahlberg, Inc., [1993-1997 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 23,536 (1994) (investigation of hearing aid manufacturer’s
claims coordinated with FDA).
35IV.
Health Claims
“Health claims” refer to a claim that a food is eﬀective in the prevention, cure, mitigation, or treatment of
any disease or symptom, as distinguished from general information on nutrition. The sphere of regulation
of health claims is one in which the contrast between the styles and personalities of the FDA and the FTC
is most evident.
A.
The NLEA and The FDA
As society’s understanding of the relationship between food, diet, and health changed, so did the need for
governmental regulation to change form and substance.187 Before the 1980s, health claims for food products
were prohibited, for any such claim would turn a food item into a drug, under the statutory deﬁnition of
drugs.188 In 1973, the FDA issued regulations using a “vague prohibition”189 against false or misleading
statements to regulate health messages in labeling. These regulations provided that “a food labeled under
the provisions of this section shall be deemed to be misbranded under sections 201(n) and 403(a) of the act
if its labeling represents, suggests, or implies: That the food because of the presence or absence of certain
187For a comparison of how the United Kingdom, Japan, and the United States have chosen to regulate health claims, see
Center for Science in the Public Interest, Functional Foods: Public Health Boon or 21st Century Quackery (Mar. 1999), at
www.cspinet.org/reports/functional foods/index.html.
188In dictum, in a 1908 case under a Kentucky inspection act, a district court judge espoused his view that a product can be
both a food and a drug:
[B]ut the act is not prevented from covering that which is a food because it is a medicine also. Conceivably an article may
be a food and a medicine both, and that when used in the same way, i.e., when taken internally. Such an article is covered by
the act notwithstanding its medicinal quality.
Savage v. Scovell, 171 F. 566, 566 – 67 (C.C. E.D. Ky. 1908).
189Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Liberating Commercial Speech: Product Labeling Controls and the First Amendment, 47
Fla. L.R. 63, 67 (1995).
36dietary properties, is adequate or eﬀective in the prevention, cure, mitigation, or treatment of any disease
or symptom.”190
In 1987, the FDA proposed a change to its prior policy and began allowing health claims for conventional
foods without premarket approval.191 This proposal would allow health claims to be made on food labeling,
as long as certain criteria were met. The basic criteria was that the information on the labeling must be
truthful and not misleading, based on and consistent with valid, reliable, scientiﬁc evidence that is publicly
available, and the label must include a description of the role of this food or ingredient in total dietary
pattern, and must comply with the nutrition labeling requirements.192 If these criteria were met, the agency
announced that it would not consider the food to be a drug within the deﬁnition of the FDCA solely because
the labeling contains a health-related message.193
Before the publishing of the 1987 proposed regulations, the FDA had already changed its enforcement pol-
icy. In 1984, the Kellogg Company began to sell its All-Bran cereal with a label that recommended to help
prevent cancer, consumers should “eat high ﬁber foods, eat foods low in fat, eat fresh fruits and vegetables,
eat a well-balanced diet and avoid being overweight.”194 The FDA never took any action against Kellogg,
19038 Fed. Reg. 2128 (1973). The regulation currently reads: “A food labeled under the provisions of this section shall be
deemed to be misbranded under sections 201(n) and 403(a) of the act if its label or labeling represents, suggests, or implies:
(1) That the food, because of the presence or absence of certain dietary properties, is adequate or eﬀective in the prevention,
cure, mitigation, or treatment of any disease or symptom. Information about the relationship of a dietary property to a disease
or health-related condition may only be provided in conformance with the requirements of § 101.14 and part 101, subpart E.”
Nutrition Labeling of Food, 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(k) (2002).
191Public Health Messages on Food Labels and Labeling, 52 Fed. Reg. 28,843 (proposed Aug. 4, 1987). Responses to this
proposed regulation varied highly. The Attorney Generals of 34 states advocated the absolute bar on health claims by food
manufacturers, arguing, inter alia, that health claims have an immense capacity to deceive. Comments of Attorneys General On
FDA Proposal Regulating Health Claims by Food Marketers, Docket Number 89N-0226, available at George Eric Rosden &
Peter Eric Rosden, The Law of Advertising, at § 13C-3 (2001). They also note that any regulations issued should consider
the role of the FTC in monitoring advertisements, speciﬁcally stating that:
In the health claims arena, FTC enforcement has not been as forceful as it should be. Under the new Chair of the FTC, it is
hoped that the FTC will seriously and vigorously enforce the FTC Act with respect to claims of this nature. This must happen,
if health claims are to be allowed at all. If the FDA limits health claims on labeling as suggested herein, only to ﬁnd that the
FTC permits a much broader type of claim to be made in consumer advertising, valuable protections against misinformation
will be lost.
Id. at § 13C-8.
192Id.
193Id. at 28,849.
194For a narrative of these events, see United States v. Undetermined Quantities of ...“Exachol,” 716 F. Supp. 787, 790
(S.D.N.Y. 1989). For a scathing critique, see Burkholz, supra note 139, at 159 – 66 (“But if the agency’s lackluster performance
in the ﬁeld of food was generally dues to an absence of resources and authority, its performance in the case of the Kellogg’s
37despite acknowledging the violations of both the food and drug provisions of the act in a draft letter, which
was never mailed.195 This lack of action was a signal to the food industry that these claims would not
be challenged; Kellogg itself made additional health claims for its other cereals, followed by General Mills,
Quaker Oats, and countless others.196
Subsequently, products claiming to cure every ailment ﬂooded the market.197 Even before this change in
policy, Herbert Burkholz, a member of FDA’s public aﬀairs staﬀ, attributed the increased number of ques-
tionable health claims to “a supine FDA and an OMB dedicated to the preservation of business interests.”198
Congress responded with the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (“NLEA”),199 and the 1987 pro-
posed regulations were revoked.200
The NLEA added section 403(r), which prohibits disease prevention claims unless it conforms with regula-
tions to be promulgated by the FDA. This section speciﬁcally addressed the standard by which the FDA is
to promulgate regulations that approve health claims, stating:
All-Bran label was nothing less than abdication or responsibility.”).
195United States v. Exachol, 716 F. Supp. at 790.
196See Burkholz, supra note 139, at 167 – 68.
197See Ilene Ringel Heller, Functional Foods: Regulatory and Marketing Developments, Food & Drug L.J. 197, 200 (2001).
See also Burkholz, supra note 139, at 184; Zachary Schiller et al., The Great American Health Pitch: Have Food Companies
Gone Overboard In Adopting That Old Parental Refrain: ’Eat It, It’s Good For You”?, Bus. Wk., Oct. 9, 1989, at 114 (noting
that “[f]ully 30% of the $3.6 billion in annual U. S. food advertising now includes some type of health message.”). Schiller also
reported on a survey conducted by Lempert Co., an ad agency, that found that “74% of Pepsi drinkers said they would switch
to Coke if it had oat bran in it,” concluding that if a health claim will sell a product, companies will use it, for “[c]ompetitive
pressures in the slow-growth food industry are likely to drag into the game even those marketers who have misgivings about
health pitches.” Id.
198Burkholz, supra note 139, at 184. Burkholz, while recognizing structural weakness in the bureaucracy, ultimately blamed
the Reagan and Bush administrations for this decline in the eﬃcacy of the FDA. Id. at 13 – 20. Speciﬁcally,
The pro-industry bias of the FDA during the Reagan-Bush administrations was never more evident than in the area of food
labeling. Responsible for regulating the truth of claims made on those labels, the agency during most of the 1980s demonstrated
a distinct reluctance to antagonize industry, coupled with an attitude toward the needs of the consumer that came close to
callous indiﬀerence. Some of this attitude was generated from within the FDA itself; more of it was forced on the agency from
the White House through an Oﬃce of Management and Budget (OMB) that was fervently devoted to free-marketeering. But
whatever the source, the FDA during those years conformed to the ethics of the time, which dictated that nothing must be
allowed to get in the way of making a buck.
Id. at 159. Robert Higgs, in defending the Republican administrations, has attacked this opinion one-sided, and based upon
a “starry-eyed view of the agency in earlier days.” Robert Higgs, The FDA Follies, Reason, Oct. 1, 1994, at 70.
199Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codiﬁed in part at 21 U.S.C. § 343(i),
(q), and (r)).
200Health Messages and Label Statements, 55 Fed. Reg. 5176 (Feb. 13, 1990).
38Based on the totality of publicly available scientiﬁc evidence (including evidence from well
designed studies conducted in a manner which is consistent with generally recognized scien-
tiﬁc procedures and principles) that there is signiﬁcant scientiﬁc agreement among experts
qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training and experience to evaluate such claims, that the claim is
supported by such evidence.201
The FDA, in applying this language, implemented a rigid standard in evaluating health claims for approval.202
As authority for this rigid standard, the FDA looked to Congressional intent in passing the NLEA.203 Under
21 C.F.R. § 101.14(c), “health claims must be supported by the totality of publicly available scientiﬁc
evidence, and there must be signiﬁcant scientiﬁc agreement among experts qualiﬁed by scientiﬁc training
and experience to evaluate such claims that this support exists.”
In applying this standard, the FDA has pre-approved twelve claims based on the relationship between a food
and the risk of disease or health-related condition.204
In using these pre-approved health claims, the claim must “be stated in a manner so that the claim is an
202General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2478 (Jan. 6, 1993) (codiﬁed as amended in scattered
sections of 21 C.F.R. pt. 101).
203General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2478 (Jan. 6, 1993) (citing to H.R. Rep. No. 101-538,
at 19 (2nd Sess. 1990)); id. at 2505 (stating that the act requires “that that be signiﬁcant scientiﬁc agreement about the
support for the claim and the mandate provided in the legislative history of the 1990 amendments that FDA have ‘a high level
of comfort that the claim is valid”’); id. at 2503 (“Congress intended the scientiﬁc standard to be ‘strong.”’).
204These are:
(1) Calcium and osteoporosis,
(2) Dietary lipids and cancer,
(3) Sodium and hypertension
(4) Dietary saturated fat and cholesterol and coronary heart disease,
(5) Fiber containing grain products, fruit, vegetables, and cancer,
(6) Fiber containing grain products, fruit, vegetables, and coronary heart disease,
(7) Fruit and vegetables and cancer,
(8) Foliate and neural tube defects,
(9) Sugar alcohols and non-development of tooth decay,
(10) Soluble ﬁber from certain foods and coronary heart disease,
(11) Soy protein and risk of coronary hearth disease,
(12) Plant sterol/stanol esters and coronary heart disease
Speciﬁc Requirements for Health Claims, 21 C.F.R. §§ 101.72 – 101.83 (2002).
39accurate representation of [the claim] ...so that the claim enables the public to comprehend the information
provided in the claim and to understand the relative signiﬁcance of such information in the context of a total
daily diet.”205
In addition to these pre-approved disease relationship claims, the FDA has promulgated regulations estab-
lishing a procedure by which a manufacturer may petition to establish new allowed claims or modify existing
ones.206 Otherwise, the FDA intends to proceed on a case-by-case basis in pre-approving further health
claims.207
The FDA has used the statutory grant of power to ban “implied” health claims as well, arguably exercising
more than its statutorily delegated power.208 The FDA identiﬁes an implied health claim by looking to the
“statements, symbols, vignettes, or other forms of communication that suggest, within the context in which
they are presented, that a relationship exists between the presence or level of a substance in the food and a
disease or health-related condition.”209
B.
The FDAMA and The FDA
During the period 1990 – 1994, misleading claims practically disappeared, replaced by ‘an orderly’ system
for approving claims.210 In 1994, Congress passed the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act, which
20521 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(B)(iii) (2000).
206Petitions for Health Claims, 21 C.F.R. § 101.70 (2002).
207General Requirements for Health Claims for Food, 58 Fed. Reg. 2478, 2506 (Jan. 6, 1993).
20858 Fed. Reg. 2482 – 2488 (Jan. 6, 1993); 21 C.F.R. § 101.14(a) & (e) (2002).
20921 C.F.R. § 101.14(a)(1) (2002).
210Heller, supra note 197, at 200.
40changed the rules for health claims for products that ﬁt within the deﬁnition of “dietary supplements.”211
As a result of these developments, misleading claims again appeared in the marketplace on those products
that could now be marketed as dietary supplements.212
Then, the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) was enacted on Nov. 21, 1997.213
The FDAMA, inter alia, allows manufacturers to use health claims based on authoritative statements pub-
lished by a scientiﬁc body of the U.S. government.214 While FDA approval is not required, the claims must
still be authorized by the agency, which is presumed if after 120 days of notice, the FDA has not issued an
interim ﬁnal regulation prohibiting the claim.215
Since these statutory changes, the FDA has issued a guidance document for the industry on how to use the
new authorization avenue.216 This guide outlines the procedures for using this new authorization procedure,
and lists the qualiﬁed scientiﬁc bodies whose authoritative statement can be relied on. This guide also
expands upon what constitutes an authoritative statement. The FDAMA itself states that an authoritative
statement must be “about the relationship between a nutrient and a disease or health-related condition,”
“published by the scientiﬁc body,” “currently in eﬀect,” and “shall not include a statement of an employee
211Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 4325. The DSHEA was unique in
that it limited the power of the FDA for the ﬁrst time since the FDA’s creation.
212Heller, supra note 197, at 200. “Foods” are distinguished from “dietary supplements,” in that to be a supplement, it must
not be represented for use as a conventional food, and is not a sole item of a meal or of the diet. 21 U.S.C. § 321(ﬀ). For an
analysis of what is required under DSHEA, see Jeﬀrey A. Crossman, Mark McGwire Does It, So Why Can’t I? High School
Student Use of Dietary Supplements and the Failure of DSHEA, 28 Cap. U. L. Rev. 617, 635 – 55 (analyzing and evaluating
the regulation of dietary supplements advertising).
213Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2295.
214Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, § 303, 111 Stat. 2295, 2351, amending
21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(3)(C).
215Speciﬁcally, the FDA must be given 120 days advance notice of marketing a product with the claim. With this notice, a
manufacture must demonstrate that the claim is based on an authoritative statement of a scientiﬁc boy “with oﬃcial responsi-
bility for public health protection or research directly relating to human nutrition,” and must submit a balanced representation
of the scientiﬁc literature on which the claim is based. The claim can be made if within the 120 days the FDA has not issued
interim ﬁnal regulations prohibiting the claim, or the FDA has successfully brought a lawsuit against the company. 21 U.S.C.
§ 343(r)(3)(C).
216Guidance for Industry: Notiﬁcation of Health Claim or Nutrient Content Claim Based on an Authoritative Statement of a
Scientiﬁc Body and Agency (June 11, 1998), available at www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼dms/hclmguid.html.
41of the scientiﬁc body made in the individual capacity of the employee.”217 The FDA further expands upon
this, requiring that the authoritative statements “reﬂect a consensus within the identiﬁed scientiﬁc body if
published by a subdivision of one of the Federal scientiﬁc bodies, and be based on a deliberative review by
the scientiﬁc body of the scientiﬁc evidence,” relying on the legislative history of the FDAMA as the basis
for its expanded requirements.218 The guide goes on to assert that the FDAMA upholds the signiﬁcant
scientiﬁc agreement standard for health claims, as under the NLEA.219
C.
FTC and Health Claims
Building upon the policies discussed earlier, the FTC encouraged “nondeceptive disease prevention claims”
that appeared in food advertising during the mid-1980s, as long as these claims complied with the substan-
tiation and deceptive policy guidelines.220
After the passage of the NLEA in 1990, the FTC reviewed its advertising policy in regard to foods, and
announced on May 13, 1994, a policy to promote consistency in the regulation of food advertising and food
labeling claims.221 The stated goal of this policy was to eliminate the confusion from the diﬀerent standards
employed by the FTC and the FDA. The FTC Enforcement Policy Statement provides that the FTC will
generally look to the FDA’s labeling regulations in evaluating nutrient content and health claims made in
food advertising, acknowledging the speciﬁc scientiﬁc expertise of the FDA.222 But the FTC did not com-
21721 U.S.C. § 343(r) (2000).
218Guidance for Industry: Notiﬁcation of Health Claim or Nutrient Content Claim Based on an Authoritative Statement of a
Scientiﬁc Body and Agency (June 11, 1998), available at www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼dms/hclmguid.html.
219Id.
220See Hutt & Merrill, supra note 143, at 187. For a good history of FTC regulation of health claims until 1990, see Richard
M. Cooper et al., History of Health Claims Regulation, 45 Food Drug Cosm. L.J. 655, 667 – 77 (1990).
221Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,388 (Jun. 1, 1994).
222Id. at 28,388 – 28,389 (“the Commission also recognizes the scientiﬁc expertise of FDA in this area. The Commission has
traditionally accorded great weight to FDA’s scientiﬁc determinations n matters of nutrition and health and will continue to
42pletely accept FDA policy, in that any claim not aﬃrmatively allowed by the FDA will not be presumptively
banned, but will be carefully scrutinized for deceptiveness according to the deceptive policy statement.223
The FTC announced it would examine health claims on a case-by-case basis.
There is no pre-clearance of advertising claims by the FTC, even if they are health claims. As discussed
earlier, the FTC requires that an advertiser should have a reasonable basis that substantiates its claim from
the time that the claim is ﬁrst made. To substantial a food health claim, the advertiser must have competent
and reliable scientiﬁc evidence, which has been speciﬁcally deﬁned as “tests, analyses, research, studies or
other evidence based on the expertise of professionals in the relevant area, that have been conducted and
evaluated in an objective manner by persons qualiﬁed to do so, using procedures generally adopted in the
profession to yield accurate and reliable results.224 This is a high standard of substantiation. “In recent
years, the Commission has rejected studies, including university studies, that were oﬀered by manufacturer
as substantiation for claims, but that the Commission concluded were of insuﬃcient quality.”225
do so. In addition, as a general matter, it is unlikely that the Commission will take action under Sections 5 and 12 of the FTC
Act regarding nutrient content and health claims if they comply with FDA’s regulations.”).
223Douglas W. Hyman, The Regulation of Health Claims in Food Advertising: Have the FTC and the FDA Finally Reached a
Common Ground?, 51 Food & Drug L.J. 191, 191 (1996). See also McNamara, supra note 225, at 435 (summarizing that “if a
company has suﬃcient data to substantiate other types of health-related claims that it has used on its labels or in other labeling,
so that if questioned by FDA the company can demonstrate that the claims are not false or misleading in any particular, the
company is likely thereby also to be in possession of suﬃcient substantiation to satisfy FTC”).
224See Enforcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,388, at 28,393 (Jun. 1, 1994) (citing to Gracewood
Fruit Co., FTC Dkt. No. C-3470 (Oct. 29, 1993) (consent order); Pompeian, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. C-3402 (Oct. 27, 1992)
(consent order).
225Stephen H. McNamara, So You Want to Market a Food and to Make Health-Related Claims – How Far Can You Go?
What Rules of Law Will Govern the Claims You Want to Make?, 53 Food Drug L.J. 421, 435 (1998) (citing to In the Matter
of Viobin Corp., 108 F.T.C. 385 (1986)(consent)). See also C. Lee Peeler & Susan Cohn, The Federal Trade Commission’s
Regulation of Advertising Claims for Dietary Supplements, 50 Food Drug L.J. 349 (1995).
43D.
Comparison of the FDA & FTC Health Claims Standards
According to the FDA, the “reasonable basis” standard of the FTC conﬂicts with the FDA’s scientiﬁc proof
for labeling claims. In withdrawing its 1987 proposal to allow health claims, the FDA explicitly rejected this
“reasonable basis standard,” stating that:
FDA is not convinced that this standard is adequate for determining the appropriateness of
claims on the food label. As several comments pointed out, it is important that consumers
maintain conﬁdence in the food label. Consumers view food labeling as more reliable and
trustworthy than food advertising.226
The FDA also explicitly rejected using the FTC’s substantiation standard when amending its regu-
lations on health claims on dietary supplements, arguing that their statutory mandates are diﬀerent;
that the FDA is a scientiﬁc agency protecting the public health while the FTC protects the economic
interests of consumers.227
The FTC does not consider its standards that diﬀerent from the FDA’s, in that both the FTC’s
“competent and reliable evidence” standard and the FDA’s “signiﬁcant scientiﬁc agreement” do not
require full consensus among scientists.228 The FTC concludes that “its is likely that the Com-
mission will reach the same conclusion as the FDA as to whether an unqualiﬁed claim about the
relationship between a nutrient or substance in a food or health-related condition is adequately sup-
ported by the scientiﬁc evidence” and “[t]he absence of an FDA determination that a health claim
is scientiﬁcally valid will be a signiﬁcant factor in the Commission’s assessment of the adequacy of
substantiation for the claim.”229
44Health claims represent a unique aspect of regulation in that the FDA is attempting to limit the ﬂow of
truthful information to consumers,230 based upon the concept that even though a health claim might be
truthful, it is inherently misleading. The FTC policy seems to be more focused on preventing unsubstantiated
claims, while the FDA is taking a more paternalistic stance. While the merits of both standards can be
debated, often overlooked is the consumption of agency resources, since many of the same claims are used
in both advertising and labeling, or when advertising is also labeling. In these circumstances, the claim will
often be evaluated twice, under standards that are highly similar, if not identical.
V.
Conclusion: The Eﬀect of the Dual Agency Structure
Thus, generally, the FTC regulates food advertising, and the FDA regulates food labeling. There is no
doubt that the debate over the proper allocation of authority will continue, for it has persisted since the
early 1900s.231
The early Supreme Court case Raladam, concerning the obesity cure Marmola, implicitly acknowledged one
weakness of the dual agency structure. In holding that the FTC did not have jurisdiction to pursue an
230For an analysis of government regulation of the disclosure of truthful information to consumers and the First Amendment
implications, speciﬁcally discussing the ﬁrst Supreme Court commercial speech decision to directly address product labeling
controls, Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995) (holding that federal regulations prohibiting the disclosure of
alcohol content in the labeling of malt beverages violated the First Amendment’s protections for commercial speech), see Noah
& Noah, supra note 189, at 73 – 105. Generally, to survive a First Amendment challenge to commercial speech, there must be
a substantial government interest that is directly advanced by the regulation, and the regulation must not be more extensive
than necessary to serve that governmental interest. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
231For a recent article arguing that the FDA should have authority over food advertising, see Roger E. Schechter, The Death
of the Gullible Consumer: Towards a More Sensible Deﬁnition of Deception at the FTC, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 571, 580 n.53
(1989) (“[O]ne should distinguish between products that are intrinsically harmful to consumers, such as dangerous toys, and
those where the risk of physical harm ﬂows from deception, such as useful medicinal products which can be harmful when
advertisements deceive consumers into using the products in excessive quantities. When products fall in the former category, a
more appropriate legal response may be to regulate or ban the sale of the product, not to insist that the manufacturer advertise
the harmful item in a diﬀerent fashion. Thus, agencies like the Consumer Products Safety Commission and the Food and Drug
Administration should have primary responsibility in cases of this sort rather than the FTC.”).
45action against the manufacturer because the existence of competition was not proven, the Court stated that
“[w]hether the respondent, in what it was doing, was subjecting itself to administrative or other proceeding
under the statute relating to the misbranding of foods and drugs we need not now inquire, for the adminis-
tration of that statute is not committed to the Federal Trade Commission.” While the barring circumstance
in this case was soon corrected by the 1938 statutory enactments, this case demonstrates the weakness of the
dual enforcement structure, in terms of agency and court resources, as well as costs to the public because of
delays and ineﬃciencies. This company, whose product by all accounts was causing deaths, was not enjoined
until 1942, 14 years after the ﬁrst complaint by the FTC.232
The coordinated action concept has worked well in many instances. For example, the FDA has withdrawn
claims in order not to prejudice a possible future proceeding by the
FTC under section 5.233 On another occasion, the FTC charged a defendant with falsely advertising the
eﬀectiveness of a product, and at the same time, the FDA ﬁled a seizure and condemnation action, thus
eﬀectively blocking all sales of the product. The defendant ultimately reached a settlement with both the
FTC and the FDA.234
In practice, the liaison has been less formal than intended by the Memorandum of Understanding, with
informal contacts continuing between agency members.235 The FTC has often used the specialized scientists
at the FDA to help with the analysis of the truthfulness of advertising claims. However, sometimes the FTC
carries some rulings beyond the point at which the FDA can scientiﬁcally agree with.236
232F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 62 S.Ct. 966 (1942).
233See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Drug ...Ova II, 414 F. Supp. 660 (D.N.J. 1975).
234Federal Trade Commission Press Release (Dec. 13, 1991); United States v. Various Articles of Device.. which include
Sporicidin, 1992-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 69,768 (D. Md. 1992). Other example of FDA and FTC cooperation can be found at
Novartis Corp., FTC Dkt 9279, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,399 (March 19, 1998) (over-the-counter drug eﬃcacy claim); In
re Levey, FTC Dkt C-3459, Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶23,415.
235See O’Reilly, supra note 6, §24.02.
236Id.
46There are also legal ramiﬁcations of the dual agency structure. Early cases held that a decision in a prior
FDA action was res judicata in a following FTC action.237
But there is another side to this dual structure. While the agencies have coordinated enforcement action,
the honest manufacturers who want to comply with the law must understand this division of labor and how
the misbranding standards might diﬀer. Not only are there consumed resources on the agency-side in this
dual system, but the manufacturers must evaluate their claims and try to anticipate both the FDA’s and
FTC’s reaction to any proposed claims. By regulating advertising and labeling, the government changes
businesses’ costs of providing market information.238
Both the FTC and the FDA justify the diﬀerences in their misbranding standards as being required by the
FTC Act and the FDCA respectively, with the FDA asserting that it is obligated to be highly protectionist
in its standards. Comparatively, the FTC views its purpose as to ensure accurate and non-misleading
information is presented to the public, but it does not consider protecting consumers from themselves within
this purpose.
But how protectionist should the FDA and FTC be? Should the FTC adopt the more paternalist standards
of the FDA? In a recent article on market manipulation, Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar noted:
237See, e.g., United States v. Willard Tablet Co., 141 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1944) (holding that the facts found by the FTC are
conclusive and biding upon this action by the FDA); George H. Lee Co. v. F.T.C., 113 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1940). See also
Sekov Corp. v. United States, 139 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1943) (declining to invoke res judicata since the issues in the earlier
FTC case were diﬀerent that those in this FDA case); United States v. Five Cases ...Capon Springs Water, 156 F.2d 493
(2nd Cir. 1946). However, asserting res judicata as a defense against a FTC action under section 5 is complicated since the
FTC is an independent agency, and not a part of the executive branch, thus privity might not exist between the FTC and
other governmental agencies. See F.T.C. v. Wilcox, 926 F. Supp. 1091, 1101 – 02 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (action by Postal Service
involving the same facts does not act as res judicata barring FTC relief); Rosden & Rosden, supra note 153, at § 18-99. See
also Scott E. Bohon, Res Judicata as a Weapon of Enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 9 Food Drug
& Cosmetic L.J. 256 (1954); Note, Res Judicata and Two Coordinate Federal Agencies, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 388 (1947).
238For a discussion of the economics of food advertising and labeling, in terms of usefulness to the con-
sumer see Lorna Aldrich, Consumer use of Information: Implications for Food Policy (1999), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/epubs/pdf/ah715/.
47Manufacturers of food products, for instance, have learned that labeling a food product
seventy-ﬁve percent non-fat instead of twenty-ﬁve percent fact can greatly increase sales.
If consumers behave rationally with respect to product risk attributes, then sales ﬁgures
would be unchanged regardless of the frame that marketers used to present nutritional
information. Nonetheless, consumers do not behave rationally in this respect – frames do
matter in product perceptions – and manufacturers are well aware of that fact.239
Should the FDA and FTC have the same standards for misbranding? While the FDA and the FTC have made
signiﬁcant progress towards cohesive regulation, their diﬀering views on their statutory purpose currently
prevents this from happening. But these agencies must change as the world around them changes. As in the
last 96 years of federal regulation of the food supply, the market’s demand for information will continue to
evolve. 240
The next generation of food sales is upon us: the Internet. The FDA has stated that “[m]arketing on
the Internet is subject to regulation in the same way as promotional materials (labeling or advertising) in
any other media. FDA and FTC are currently engaged in discussions on how to appropriately apply each
agency’s authority to sale of products such as vitamins on the Internet.”241
And so the debate will continue.
240Betty Campbell, then director of the Oﬃce of Food Labeling of the FDA, stated in December of 1999, “The market is
moving faster than we can sit down and think things through.” Heller, supra note 197, at 198 (citing to a speech by Campbell, to
the FDLI annual meeting in December 1998, in FDA Labeling Policy Established Through Enforcement, FOOD REG. WKLY.,
Jan. 4, 1999, at 4.)
241U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Answers to Stakeholders’ Questions, at www.fda.gov/oc/fdama/fdamawebcast/stakeholdersquestions/foods.html
(Apr. 28, 1999). The FDA has indicated that it will proceed on a case-by-case method in regulating “labeling” on the
Internet, since “any rule or guidance on this issue would be quickly outdated due to the ongoing rapid changes in the Internet
and its use.” Letter from Margaret M. Dotzel, Associate Commissioner for Policy of the FDA, to Daniel J. Popeo and Paul
D. Kamenar, Washington Legal Foundation (Nov. 1, 2001), available at www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼dms/labwww.html. In this
letter, the FDA speciﬁcally refused to deﬁne absolutely information “presented or available on a company’s Internet website,
including hyperlinks to other third party sites” as either labeling or advertising, stating that the “FDA believes that, in
certain circumstances, information about FDA-regulated products that is disseminated over the Internet by, or on behalf of, a
regulated company can meet the deﬁnition of labeling in section 201(m) of the FDCA.”
48